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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
)'.) 
.JI 
s·TATE OF UTAH 
REX HOLLAND, 
REX HOLLAND, Administrator with the Will 
Annexed of the Estate of JOHN G. 
HOLLAND, Deceased, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
COLUMBIA IRON MINING COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
COLUMBIA STEEL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
GENEVA STEEL COMPANY, a corporation, 
UNITED STATES STEEL COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
UNITED STATES STEEL CORPORATION, 
a corporation, 
ARTHUR E. MORETON, ETHEL T. 
~~~ MORETON, also known as E. T. MORE-
TON, JOHN R. MORETON, also known as 
J. R. MORETON, ROSE ANN P. MORE-
TON, SUSAN MORETON TEVIS, WIL-
LIAM C. MURIE, JOHN DOE II-XXV, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
Case No. 8237 
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a summary judgment entered 
1n favor of the corporate defendants and against the 
pl'aintiffs. The judgment was entered prior to answer of 
the amended complaint by any of the defendants. 
The action was brought by Rex Holland individually 
and as administrator with the will annexed of the estate 
of his father, John Holland, against Arthur Moreton, a 
lawyer and members of his immediate family and 
against five corporations, hereinafter referred to as the 
corporate defendants. The lower court denied the mo-
tion to dismiss and motion for summ'ary judgment filed 
by the Moretons, but granted the motion for summary 
judgment filed by the corporate defendants. 
The case arises out of a transaction wherein Moreton, 
acting on behalf of himself and the other owners, sold 
to the corporate defendants a piece of mining property 
made up from what had been three mining clain1s. Rex 
and John Holland and one ~I urie had owned the claims 
and transferred to Moreton a one-fourth interest therein 
to act as a:t~torney in obtaining patents thereon and as 
agent in negotiating i:he sale. He 1nade the sale and the 
corporate defendants paid to him $287,500.00 for his one-
fourth interes~t and $33,333.33 to each of the others for 
their respective one-fourth interests. 
The basis of the liability of 1\<foreton is his breach 
of confidential relationship with the Hollands and 1\furie 
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by fraudulent misrepresentation as to the value and price 
of the mining claims and his fraudulent concealment from 
the Hollands and Murie of the amount which he received 
for his interest in said claims. 
The basis of liability of the corporate defendants is 
their conspiracy with :Moreton and their participation in 
and aiding Moreton in the fraudulent concealment of the 
amount being paid and paid :Moreton for his one-fourth 
interest. 
The record upon which the summary judgment was 
granted consists of the Amended Complaint, the Motions 
of the corporate defendants, Answers to Interrogatories, 
Affidavits of Rex Holland and the Depositions of Rex 
Holland, Clara Holland, Arthur Moreton and Dr. Walter 
J\Iathesius and Merrill Heald who handled the trans-
action for the corporate defendants. 
The facts upon which plaintiff basicly rely for recov-
ery against the defendants, both individual and corpo-
rate, are simple. 
The two Hollands and Murie employed Moreton as 
their attorney to obtain patents on the three mining 
claims in return for which he was to receive a one-fourth 
interest in the claims (Rex Holland, dep., p. 11). Moreton 
also agreed to follow the sale of the property (Rex Hol-
land dep., p. 26). Acting in behalf of the co-owners as 
{:!: attorney and trusted agent and at a time when the Agree-
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ment of Ownership (Ex. 3, Rex Holland dep.) was the 
controlling document Moreton negotiated a sale with and 
to the corporate defendants whereby he sold the one-
quarter interest of each the Hollands and Murie for $33,-
333.33 and his own quarter interest for $287,500.00. The 
basis of the purchase by the corporate defendants was 
that the property contained 1,550,000 tons of ore and 
the price was 25c per ton (Mathesius dep., p. 11, 12). 
In other words, the property was sold for $387,500.00 and 
:Jioreton took $287,500.00 and each of the co-owners re-
ceived $33,333.33. 
The Hollands and 1f urie were never told the amount 
which l\foreton received for his interest. The 
liability of the corporate defendants is based upon their 
participation in and aiding l\foreton in concealing this 
vital infonnation thereby enabling him to consmnmate his 
fraudulent breach of confidential relationship with the 
Hollands and Murie. 
The specific acts whereby they accon1plished this are 
set forth in detail in the runended cmnplaint (R. 23-28) 
and on pages 32-46 of this Brief. 
Although the interest owned by the four was an un-
divided interest, nevertheless the corporate defendants 
did not follow their usual policy of handling the trans-
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adion as a single transaction but handled it as two sepa-
rate transactions making out separate and distinct doc-
uments for the offer, acceptance, sale and transfer of the 
three-fourths interest and for the one-fourth interest 
(Heald dep., p. 14-29), thereby enabling the sale to be 
completed without disclosure of the amount received by 
:J[ordon. They did this even though they knew by virtue 
of the letter of Septen1ber 1-t, 1948 (Appendix A) that 
the co-owners desired their fair share. 
There is a genuine issue of fact on the question of 
disclosure. Both Rex Holland and Clara Holland testi-
fied that :Jiathesius made no such disclosure and they did 
not know until long after the amount :Moreton in fact re-
ceived. 
Thus by the co-operation of the corporate defendants 
acting through :\Iathesius and Heald, :Jloreton was en-
abled while acting as attorney and trusted agent to walk 
off with $287,500.00 while his clients principals and equal 
owners received only $33,333.33 apiece. 
STArrE:J1ENT OF THE CASE 
In 1946 or 1947, the Columbia Iron :Mining Co., here-
inafter referred to as "Columbia", one of the corporate 
defendants herein, was thinking about opening nego-
tiations towards the purchase of a piece of property 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
containing a large deposit of iron ore. This property, 
located in Iron County, Utah, was known as the "Milner" 
property. 
Three prospectors, John Holland, his son Rex Hol-
land, and William C. Murie, hereinafter sometimes 
referred to as the "co-owners", had jointly located three 
1nining claims which happened to adjoin the :Milner prop-
erty. These claims were known as the ''~1 & H'' claims. 
Colu1nbia knew about the ~1 & H claims and knew 
that the iron o-re body in the Milner property extended 
into them (M:athesius' dep., p. 6, lines 2-4; p. 44, lines 1-4). 
Even though the ~1 & H claims contained substantial 
deposits of iron ore, they were only of moderate value 
standing by themselves. However, because the ~I & H 
clailns adjoined the l\filner property and therefore could 
be 1nined by the same single facility used to mine the 
l\iilner property, the~~ would be easy and cheap to mine 
along with the ~lilner property. Therefore, the :J1 & H 
claims would be extremely valuable to Columbia in the 
event, but only in the event, that Colun1bia acquired the 
l\:filner property (Mathesius' dep., p. 7, lines 13-16; p. 44, 
lines 1-13). 
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All of this was unknown to the co-owners. They had 
no idea even as to the amount of tonnage contained in 
their property or its value per ton. It was impossible for 
them, or at least they knew of no \va.y, to find out what 
their claims \vere worth (Moreton's dep., p. 72, lines 6-11; 
R. 90, 91). They believed their claims had a maximum 
worth of somewhere around $5000.00 (:Moreton's dep., p. 
:2G, lines 28-30; p. 27, lines 1-25; p. 193, lines 1-5). 
Either in 1946 or 19-!7/ \Valter .Jiathesius became 
the president of several of the corporate defendants, 
including Columbia. Mathesius knew Arthur E. Moreton, 
a Utah lawyer. They both belonged to the Alta Club in 
Salt Lake City (Moreton's dep., p. 132, lines 10-23). 
X either one of the men will state exactly how, when or 
where they first met or their first meeting took place 
(~Iathesius' dep., p. 5, lines 9-23; p. 45, lines 16-22; p. 46, 
lines 10-18; p. -!9, lines 15-18; Heald's dep., p. 10, lines 
19-22). \Vhile they do not agree as to how, where or \vhen 
it took place, it probably occurred either in 1946 or 1947/ 
but quite apparently BEFORE l\1oreton had any connec-
tion at all with the claims (~fathesius' dep., p. 50, lines 
8-17). 
1 In one place Mathesius said it occurred in 1946 (Mathesius' dep., 
p. 4, lines 21-22) and in another he said it occurred in 1947 (.Mathesius' 
dep., p. 32, lines 3-5). 
2 On page 78, lines 7, 21-27 and on page 89 of Moreton's deposition, 
lines 15-17, Moreton testified that his first contact with Mathesius 
on another deal (Sunbeam No. 8) was in July of 1947 and it was at 
that time that they talked about the M & H claims. On 
line 28 of the same page he decides that it was in January, 1947. On 
page 90, line 1, he says it may have been April of 1947. On line 4 of 
the same page, he says it was more likely in May of 1947. In another 
place he says he cannot tell what month or even what year it was 
(Moreton's dep., p. 133, lines 23-25). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
At this 1neeting Mathesius advised :Moreton of Co-
luntbia's tentative plan to acquire the Milner property 
and instructed the lawyer to contact the prospectors and 
get the prospectors to employ him as their attorney3 to 
patent the M & H claims and to authorize him to later 
act as their attorney and agent in selling the property to 
Colu1nbia ( 11athesius' dep., pp. 5, 6, 7 ; p. 8, lines 5-6; 
Defendants' Exhibit #5 of Rex Holland's deposition). 
"I (Mathe~sius) said (to Moreton) that Moreton 
might suggest to the holders of these (M & H) 
claims, that they get them patented ... " (Mathe-
sius' dep., p. 8, lines 5-6). 
" ... So I C~Iathesius) told him (:Moreton) I 
would suggest he (:Moreton) tell the holder~s of 
these claims to proceed with the patenting, bring-
ing their title to date, and after that I would be 
willing to talk business with him. 
Q. And did he at that time state what his con-
nection with these clalins was 1 
A. No. 
Q. Did he at any time state that he was repre-
senting the people who owned these claimsf 
A. No." (Thiathesius' dep., p. 50, lines 8-17) 
It is apparent that at the first and second times that 
Mathes'ius 1nentioned the ni & H properties to :Moreton, 
whether it was 1946 or 1947, nioreton obviously was not 
yet representing the co-owners and had no interest in the 
a Inferentially 
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proper,ties. If at that time ~Ioreton was already repre-
senting the co-owners, he would have told Mathesius so 
and that he had an interest in the property (Mathesius' 
dep., p. 49, lines 8-18). :Moreton, apparently following 
out l\Iathesius' instructions, went to Cedar City, Utah4 
(Rex Holland's dep., p. 8, lines 16-20; p. 9, lines 1-20), 
where the three prospectors were living, and sent for 
them to come to his hotel. These prospectors were ex-
tremely naive, of trusting dispositions and completely 
lacking in business experience (R. 2, 90). 
4 This was in the spring of 1947, according to Rex Holland (Rex 
HolLand's dep., p. 8, lines 16-20; p. 9, lines 1-20) or in the spring of 
1946, according to Moreton. Moreton claims that his first meeting 
with the co-owners was on April 6, 1946, that he just happened to be 
in Cedar City and that he just happened to run into one of the co-
owners and without knowing anything at all about the property, 
agreed to patent the property for a one-fourth interest and took an 
option on the remaining three-fourths interest for $100,000.00 (More-
ton's dep., p. 9, 10, 11; p. 26, lines 13-15). However, he could not 
produce and has not to this date produced an agreement or option 
dated April 6, 1946, his excuse being that he cannot find them 
(Moreton's dep., p. 1, 10, 11). He never again saw the alleged 
document of April 6, 1946 (Moreton's dep., p. 17, lines 6-7) and 
there is no written record to substantiate Moreton's claim that his 
first meeting took place in April, 1946 (Moreton's dep., p. 13, lines 
9-12). 
Rex Holland's original recollection of the first meeting with 
Moreton was that it took place in 1947. While it is true that Moreton 
obtained the signatures of the co-owners to a document dated Septem-
ber 1, 1946, it may well be that the document was not signed on the 
date stated. Additionally, its reference to the "lost" option (Moreton's 
dep., p. 9, 10, 11, 12), without stating any definite sum of money, 
renders it suspect. 
As against that, there is a written record that the co-owners 
appointed Moreton their attorney to act in the patent proceedings 
on March 11, 1947 (Moreton's dep., p. 123, lines 13-15) and Moreton 
admits that his first work on the patent began on that date (More-
ton's dep., p. 29, lines 14-16). 
However, it is not necessary in order to hold the corporate 
defendants liable to prove that they instigated the conspiracy or for 
them to have been in the conspiracy with the Moretons from its 
inception (Franck v. Moran, 36 Cal. App. 32, 171 P. 841, 1918). 
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One of the prospectors, Rex Holland, was partially 
blind (Moreton's dep., p. 220, lines 1-3). John Holland 
and William C. Murie were both elderly men and quite 
ill (Moreton's dep., p. 247, lines 9-13; Mathesius' dep., p. 
9, lines 7-9). The lawyer concealed the fact that Co-
lumbia had sent him or had told him to suggest to them 
that they employ him to patent their claims and the fact 
that the property contained a large deposit of ore, that 
Columbia might buy the adjoining (:Milner) property, in 
which event it would want their property and that the ore 
was or would then be worth at least 25 cents per ton, and 
so very easily got them to employ him as their attorney 
(R.ex Holland's dep., p. 110; p. 111, line 20 through p. 112, 
line 5; p. 113, line 3) and to agree in writing that he, 
Moreton should receive a one-fourth interest in the prop-
' 
erty for getting the claims patented (Rex Holland's dep., 
p. 10, lines 25-30; p. 11, lines 1-30; p. 113, line 17 through 
p. 114, line 1). 
At that first meeting,5 the co-owners placed their 
confidence and trust in Moreton. They agreed, at More-
ton's instruction, to discuss the property with no one else. 
(Rex Holland's dep., p. 111, line 20 through p. 112, line 
5; p. 112, lines 14-18; p. 112, line 22 through p. 113, line 
3; p. 113, line 17 through p. 114, line 1). 1.fathesius and 
Moreton then had another meeting. 
5 According to Rex Holland, nothing at all was said about any 
option at the first meeting (Rex Holland's dep., p. 17, lines 19-26). 
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Neither ::\fathesius nor Moreton will fix the time or 
place with n1uc.h certainty, but the meeting seems to have 
also occurred in 1947, although possibly in 1948. At this 
meeting, ~fathesius advised Moreton that Columbia had 
in fact acquired the l\Iilner property and that he, More-
ton, should complete the patenting of the property as 
Columbia was ready to buy it (~fathesius' dep., p. 7, 
lines 20-25 ; p. 8, lines 1-9). 
~Ioreton, over a period of one and one-half or two 
years and sometimes at the direction of or with the as-
sistance of the corporate defendants, prepared a great 
number of different kinds of additional documents per-
taining to the property, including offers to sell, deeds, 
contracts, letters, agreements, options (one undated 
[Defendants' Exhibit 2, Rex Holland's deposition]) ; 
another allegedly lost (:Moreton could not produce the 
original document which purportedly gave him a one-
fourth interest and option ·to buy for $100,000.00 More-
ton's dep., p. 11, lines 11-12) ; third option which did not 
recite any purchase price, etc. The lawyer obtained the 
signatures of the prospectors to all of them. The pro-
spectors were never left with copy of what they had 
signed (Rex Holland's dep., p. 29, lines 25-26; p. 36, lines 
20-27; p. 37, lines 14-15). Mo~reton never paid them for 
any of the purported options (Moreton's dep., p. 20, lines 
~~/ 13-14; p. 24, lines 12-20). 
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One of the documents was a so-called "Agreement 
of Ownership", 6dated July 20,1947, which was to replace 
and supplant one of the purported options (Rex Holland's 
dep., p. 73, lines 13-26; Defendants' Exhibit 3, Rex Hol-
land's deposition). The lawyer had told the prospectors 
that their property contained 1,333,000 tons of ore or 
maybe a LITTLE more and that they couldn't expect 
more than 10 cents per ton because of the depth of the ore 
body (Overburden) (Rex Holland's dep., p.121, lines 5-9; 
p. 122, lines 3-8) and that he would try to sell the property 
on that basis (Rex Holland's dep., p. 21, lines 1-4; p. 23, 
lines 6-12; p. 28, lines 1-7; p. 121, lines 5-19; p. 124, line 
23 through p. 125, line 8 ; p. 125, line 30 through p. 126, 
line 18; p. 126, lines 22-25; p. 126, line 30; p. 127, lines 
1-2; line 23 through p. 128, line 2). 
It is obvious from a reading of the cleverly contrived 
language of the so-called "Agreement of Ownership" 
that l\1oreton had told them that the ore in the body was 
worth only ten cents per ton and that therefore the prop-
6 It is impossible to figure out even from Moreton's own records 
or his testimony just what interest, or the basis thereof, if any, he had 
in the M & H property or what documents he was relying upon. For 
example, Moreton admitted that up until the time he received a deed 
dated August 23, 1947, he had no interest in the property. Admittedly 
he has neither paid for nor ever exercised any of the options (Mo~e­
ton's dep., p. 210, lines 1-2'6). Admittedly, he did not thereafter acquire 
any interest in the property nor did he ever exercise any of the pur-
ported options. Again, on the 25th day of August, 1947, he prepared 
the Application for Patent, which was filed with the U. S. government, 
for the signatures of the co-owners, which application recited that 
they, the co-owners, each still owned a one-third interest in the prop-
erty (Moreton's dep., p. 210, lines 1-6). This document was prepared 
by Moreton after the purported "Agreement of Ownership." If the 
co-owners each owned one-third of the property at that time, Moreton 
never had any interest at all in the property. 
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~mt: erty would bring close to $133,000.00. Otherwise he would 
~~- not have recited that figure of $133,000.00 at all. 
~~~ 
Because of these concealments and false represen-
tations the co-owners assumed that the buyer would not 
pay much more than $133,000.00, that ~Ioreton, therefore, 
would not receiYe 1nuch more than one-fourth of the total 
amount paid hy the buyer and thus were persuaded to 
agree that l\[oreton should so receive all over the $100,-
000.00 and to that extent consented to his receiving all 
over $100,000.00 for his one-fourth interest in the pro-
perty.7 
At a later date ~Ioreton told the co-owners their 
property contained between 1,-!00,000 and 1,550,000 tons. 
\Vhile there is evidence in the record that the figure of 
1,550,000 tons is correct, there is also evidence in the 
record that varying estimates up to approximately 6,000,-
000 tons are correct (Plaintiffs' amended complaint, R. 
8, 1-!, 16, 17, :22); Rex Holland's deposition, Defendants 
answer to Interrogatories, R. 48). If these latter esti-
mates of the tonnage contained in the .:\I & H claims are 
correct, l\foreton concealed the true tonnage of ore con-
tained in the property. 
afg~ 
.{t( ~Ioreton concealed the fact that Columbia might pur-
;:: chase the ~Iilner property and that if they did, the ore in 
~J; 
nili!f 7 No reason whatsoever has been advanced by Moreton or anyone 
~~~ else why the agreement provided that Moreton was to get all over 
~·" 6· $133,000.00, in addition to his one-fourth of that amount (Moreton's 
~~~~ dep., p. 218, lines 26, 29-30; p. 219, lines 1-2). 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1-:1: 
the l\1 & H properties would be and was worth 25 cents or 
nwre per ton. l\1oreton also concealed the fact that Col-
umbia acquired the Milner property. He represented that 
the ore in the l\1 & H properties was worth only 10 cents 
per ton (Rex Holland's dep., p. 121, lines 5-19). :Moreton 
represented that he was going to get the same amount or 
perhaps a LITTLE more for his one-fourth as each of the 
co-owners was getting for each of their one-fourth (Rex 
Holland' 8 dep., p. 125, line 30, through p. 126, line 18; 
p. 127, line 23 through p. 128, line 2). Moreton concealed 
the mnount of 1noney that he was getting for his one-
fourth. 
In Septmnber or October, 1948, Colmnbia prepared 
a single contract of sale between the co-owners and More-
ton as the sellers and Columbia as the buyer. This con-
tract (admittedly later destroyed by Columbia- Heald's 
dep., p. 17, lines 16-22-) covered the entire l\1 & II 
property and recited the total price Colun1bia was paying 
for it (Heald's dep., p. 1-!, lines 17-18). Colmnbia for-
warded the contract to l\foreton) apparently hoping that 
the co-owners would sign the contract without reading 
it, as they had signed other documents submitted to them 
by Moreton. 
About Septe1nber 1:2, 1948, before (according to both 
Moreton and l\[athesius) eithe1~ l\foreton or Columbia had 
ascertained the tonnage contained in the l\1 & H property 
and before they had discussed any price per ton and 
before any contract was subn1itted to the prospectors for 
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their signatures, one of the prospectors, Rex Holland, 
heard from a Parley Canfield that the :\I & H property 
contained an estimated 3,500,000 tons of ore "and that 
it. was being offered for sale for 25. cents per ton" (Rex 
Holland'8 letter of September 14, 1948; Rex Holland's 
dep., Defendants' Exhibit #5, page :2, lines 11-12). (This 
estimate was high by 2,000,000 tons according to the 
testimony of ~:fathesius-~fathesius' dep., p. 12, lines 
-±-5; p. 71, lines 11-12 p. 1-±5, lines 9-16). Rex thereupon 
(September 14, 1948) wrote a letter to ~fathesius (De-
fendants' Exhibit #5, Rex Holland's dep., Appendix A of 
thi:; brief) for the purpose of finding out how much the 
steel company was paying for ore at that time (Rex Hol-
land's dep., p. 32, lines 16-19), since the co-owners knew 
of no sales or prices paid and had no other way to deter-
mine the value of the property (bottom line, page 1, 
lines 1-7, page 2 of second affidavit of Rex Holland, R. 
90, 91; ::\Ioreton's dep., p. 72, lines 6-11; plaintiffs' 
amended complaint, R. J +, 15) or of getting an equal divi-
sion of the money (Rex Holland's dep., p. 76, lines 28-29; 
p. 77, lines 10-11). The letter advised ~fathesius that he, 
Rex, had heard that the property contained 3,500,000 
tons of ore and that it was being offered at 25 cents per 
ton. The letter requested a one-fourth, three-fourths divi-
sion of the money and notified the president that the 
Agreement of Ownership with the lawyer was based 
upon the supposition that the lawyer was to get one-
fourth of the money Columbia was paying for the entire 
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property. The letter also suggested that the deal should 
be postponed until such time as it was understood that 
1\foreton was to receive one-fourth and the co-owners 
three-fourths. 
The other two co-owners did not know the contents 
of this letter to Mathesius (Rex Holland's dep., p. 78, 
lines 17-18; Moreton's dep., p. 168, lines 11-17, 25-27). 
After Mathesius received the letter from Rex Hol-
land he had a telephone conversation with :Moreton. It 
was in this telephone conversation that the pretended 
''negotiations" in their entirety for the sale of the :M & H 
property took place. According to 1\foreton and :Mathe-
sius both, the entire "negotiations" consisted of 38 words. 
l\1athesius told 1\foreton that Columbia would pay 25 
cents a ton based upon Columbia's estimate of the ton-
nage and lVIoreton answered that that was agreeable ·with 
hiin. 
"A. He (Mathesius) said that they would be will-
ing to pay twenty-five cents per ton upon ~he 
estin1ate that 1\Ir. Sargis might co;me up w1th 
after he had completed his making his survey 
and his notes. 
Q. What did you say~ 
A. I said that would be agreeable." (l\1:oreton's 
dep., p. 137, line 30 through p. 138, line 4 ; See 
also, Moreton~s dep., p. 270, lines 10-11; p. 273, 
lines 15-18; p. 269, lines 14-16; p. 281, lines 
13-16) 
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It is nowhere even claimed by anyone that there were 
ever any separate negotiations covering either the three-
fourths interest of the co-owners or the one-fourth inter-
est of Moreton. 
Mathesius then had a meeting with the lawyer in 
regard to Rex's letter. This meeting was held in the 
lawyer's office about October 1, 1948 (Moreton's dep., p. 
134, lines 12-30, p. 135). Mathesius read the letter to the 
lawyer (Moreton's dep., p. 139, lines 17-18) and furnished 
the lawyer with a copy thereof (Moreton's dep., p. 134, 
lines 21-22). 
F·rom this letter it appears that Rex was mis-
informed about the transaction and that he claimed the 
co-owners should get a three-fourths share of any price 
paid. Yet Dr. Mathesius decided he would not contact 
him (Mathesius dep., p. 83). He could thereby have 
learned of Rex's contention and could have advised him 
directly of the negotiations. He determined not to an-
swer Rex's letter. By this conduct he eliminated Rex 
from any source of informrution except Moreton. The 
letter of October 16, 1948 was obtained by Moreton. He 
noticed that there was nothing in it indicating that the 
co-owners knew what Moreton was getting (Mathesius' 
;,/ dep., p. 92). He did not inquire whether the co-owners 
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had been told the price per ton which would be paid or 
the total price and he did not know whether they knew 
this important fact (Mathes;ius' dep., p. 97, 98; Moreton's 
dep., p. 139, lines 29, 30; p. 140, lines 1, 2, 13-16, 18-21; 
p. 160, lines 8-13, 27-30; p.161, lines 1-24). 
After writing the letter to M.:athesius (sometime be-
tween September 1-t, 1948 and October 1, 1948), Rex 
Holland was told by Parley Canfield that the figure of 
3,500,000 tons previously given him by Canfield included 
the tonnage contained in the adjoining, much larger 
(Short Line Claims, Milner) property8 (First affidavit 
of Rex Holland R. 81). Rex then concluded that on that 
basis 1foreton's estimate of the tonnage of the ~1 & H 
property alone was about correct. Rex then realized 
that either he or Canfield had been mistaken as to what 
Canfield had said regarding the 1natter of tonnage and 
the price at which it was being offered. He then recon-
sidered the positive statements n1ade by :Moreton that 
the tonnage of the ~1 & H clain1s was 1,550,000; that it 
was worth much less than the 25 cents per ton he had 
heard was the asking price for the entire ore body be-
cause of its (the M & H property's) overburden (R. 81, 
82; Moreton's dep., p. 71, lines 18-21) ; that regardless of 
the price that Moreton may have offered it for, Columbia 
would not pay more than 10 cents per ton (Rex Holland's 
dep., p. 121, lines 5-9; p. 122, lines 3-8) and concluded 
8 Even Mathesius realized that Rex's information was based upon 
the total tonnage of both the Milner and M & H properties ( Mathesius' 
dep., p. 85, lines 6-18) 
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that Canfield had been in error and that he had been in 
error in entertaining the idea that there was substantially 
more ore in the property than what Moreton had repre-
sented there was; that the 25 cents per ton was an error 
and that Columbia was paying 10 cents per ton and that 
Columbia was paying $133,000.00 or a little more for 
the property, and, therefore, the information upon which 
he had based his letter to Mathesius was erroneous (First 
Affidavit of Rex Holland, R. 81, 82). R.ex was influenced 
additionally not to press the matter because he now felt 
that if there had been any truth in his letter, Mathesius 
would have contacted him (R. 82). Thus Rex was re-
assured that Colu1nbia was not paying Moreton much 
more than one-fourth of the entire sale price. He again 
believed that Columbia or whoever it was (he thought 
Geneva Steel Co.) that was buying the property was 
paying approximately $133,000.00 for it and that they 
were paying Moreton not much more than one-fourth of 
$133,000.00. 
Rex was then convinced that Moreton had told him 
the truth and had given him the correct advice regard-
ing the tonnage and how much Columbia was paying per 
ton for the property and its value and that he had been 
> mistaken in ever doubting the representations of More-
ton, his attorney; that his momentary distrust of More-
~: ton had been unjustified and unwarranted; and that 
J!J~ Moreton was not imposing upon him (R. 82). 
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Rex definitely concluded to rely on Moreton and that 
Moreton had acted and was acting honestly towards him 
and trusted, believed and relied implicitly upon the state-
ments o.f Moreton and Moreton alone regarding the ton-
nage, the value thereof per ton and the amount per ton 
that Columbia was paying for it and that the value there-
of was approximately $133,000.00. By reason thereof 
and because Moreton was his attorney, Rex's former com-
plete confidence in Moreton was restored (R. 82). 
In the meantime, Mathesius, in the furtherance of 
the conspiracy, destroyed the single contract (Heald's 
dep., p. 16, lines 29; p. 17, lines 1-10, 16-24; p. 37, lines 
8-10) providing for the sale and purchase of the entire 
property and which recited the total amount of money 
Columbia was paying for the entire property. He then 
departed from his usual practice, (Heald's dep., p. 15, 
lines 3-6) and instructed Moreton to submit two separate 
offers to sell, one by the lawyer and one by the three 
co-owners. The offer to sell covering the sale of the 
purported one-fourth interest of !:loreton recited the 
amount of 1noney Columbia was to pay him. The offer 
to sell covering the three-fourths interest of the co-
owners recited only the sum of $100,000.00 (Heald's dep., 
pp. 21, 22; Moreton's dep., p. 281, lines 26-27). 
Mathesius, again in furtherance of the conspiracy, 
then instructed 1\Ioreton to prepare and obtain the signa-
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tures of the prospectors to a letter dated October 16, 
1948 (Defendants' Exhibit #8, Rex Holland's deposition, 
Appendix B of this brief.) 9 The letter states that the co-
owners understood that Columbia estimates the tonnage 
to be 1,550,000 but omits the price per ton that Columbia 
is paying for the property, and recites further that 
" ... Mr. Moreton may offer and sell his 
interest in said claims for whatever price you (Co-
lumbia) and he may agree upon, if he so desires, 
and the entire proceeds therefrom will of course 
be his sole property, it being his right to deter-
mine and to receive whatever amount you may 
agree upon with him." (l\1:oreton's dep., p. 312, 
lines 5-7; Defendants' Exhibit #8, Rex Holland's 
deposition, Appendix B of this brief.) 
But the an10unt :Moreton was to receive wa1s not stated 
therein. 
The patent from the U.S. Government to the l\1: & H 
property came through on October 22, 1948. 
~Iathesius, apparently still concerned about the mat~ 
ter and again in furtherance of the conspiracy, then fur-
ther instructed Moreton to prepare and obtain the signa-
tures of the co-owners to a second letter, dated November 
20, 1948, (Defendants' Exhibit #9, Rex Holland's deposi-
tion, Appendix C of this brief)/0 and again to omit in 
9 See analysis of this letter under No. 27 of the specific respects 
in which the corporate defendants participated in the accomplish-
ment of the fraud, etc. 
10 See analysis of this letter under Point No. 28 of the specific 
respects, etc. 
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said letter any mention of the amount of 1noney they had 
agreed to pay Moreton for his purported one-fourth in-
terest and to reaffirm therein that 
"An interest in these claims is also held by 
Arthur E. :Moreton, and it is no concern of ours 
as to when and to whom he may sell his interest 
or at what price or upon what terms.'' (Defend-
ants' Exhibit #9, Rex Holland's dep., Appendix C 
of this brief.) 
Said letters were presented to the co-owners by their 
attorney, 1\f oreton, for their signatures on their respec-
tive dates. None of the co-owners knew or suspected 
that the corporate defendants had conspired with the 
Moretons to defraud them in connection with the sale of 
said property ( R. 91). J\tforeton had represented and the 
co-owners believed that the entire ili & H property was 
worth approximately $133,000.00 and was being sold for 
approximately that amount (R. 91); that his, Moreton's, 
share of the total consideration to be paid by Columbia 
for the ni & H property was the same as the co-owners, 
with perhaps a small additional amount for his services 
(R. 91). Had the co-owners known that Columbia was 
paying approximately 25 cents per ton for the ore or the 
actual value of the property, or the total consideration 
paid therefor, or that J\tioreton "Tas to be paid a grossly 
disproportionate share of the total consideration they 
' 
would not have signed the said letters of October 16, 
1948, and November 20, 1948 (R. 91, 92). 
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The co-owners, two of \Yhom had never heard that 
their claims contained much more in excess of 1,550,000 
tons of ore or that Colunrbia was paying anything in ex-
cess of ten cents per ton, and who had never heard that 
the ~I & H claims were worth n1uch more than $133,000.00 
and who, therefore, had never been suspicious of More-
ton, all now believing that the total tonnage contained 
in their property was 1,550,000, that Columbia was pay-
ing only ten cents per ton, that the total price Columbia 
was paying for the property was not Inuch 1nore than 
$133,000.00 and that Columbia was not paying 1\ioreton 
much more than one-fourth of that amount or about 
$33,000.00 for his one-fourth interest in the property, 
and having complete confidence in ~Ioreton, their attor-
ney, and relying upon him and no one else and assuming 
to be true what he had told them regarding the price per 
ton that the ore was worth and that that was the price 
Columbia was paying for the property and satisfied that 
Columbia was paying :Moreton only a LITTLE nwre for 
his one-fourth, signed the two· letters and the offer to 
sell their three-fourths interest. 
Columbia, after receiving the separate offer of sale 
covering the three-fourths interest of the co-owners and 
the two letters all signed by the co-owner~, departed from 
their usual practice and prepared two separate· contracts 
of sale. One contract recited the amount of money Co~ 
lumbia was paying 1\ioreton for his one-fourth interest 
and the second recited the amount of money Columbia 
was paying the co-owners for their three-fourths interest. 
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Mathesius and Moreton then agreed that the co-
owners should be instructed to con1e to Salt Lake City 
and for the deal to be closed on December 20, 1948, in 
Moreton's office (Mathesius' dep., p. 15, lines 20-23). 
The co-owners, in response to a telegram, went to 
Salt Lake City and to Moreton's office on December 20, 
1948 (Rex Holland's dep., p. 32). 
The deal was closed in the office of attorney :More-
ton. The testimony is in conflict on the question of who 
presided over this meeting. According to Rex Holland, 
Moreton did. He sat at his desk and read the document 
relating to the co-owners interest, and l\1athesius sat at 
the back of the room with little or nothing to say (Rex 
Holland's dep., p. 33-36). Moreton's testimony indicates 
that he sat at his desk and was apparently in charge 
(Moreton's dep., p. 154). Mathesius claimed to have been 
in charge, sitting at the desk and doing all the talking 
(Mathesius' dep., p. 15-19). This discrepancy is of signi-
ficance in establishing the existence of an issue of fact. 
If Dr. Mathesius was not in fact in charge of the meet-
ing, then there is less likelihood that he read from the 
documents relating to l\1oreton's quarter. 
Also, Rex and his mother testified that only the 
co-owners papers and transaction was mentioned and 
nothing was said about the Moreton share (Rex Holland 
dep., p. 34, 35; Clara Holland dep., p. 5-7). 
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At the time of this Ineeting the co-owners did not 
know the price per ton being paid nor did they know the 
amount :Moreton was receiving for his share nor how the 
amounts were arrived at. The record is clear that the cor-
porate defendants, through Mathesius and Heald, knew 
they should have disclosed to the co-owners the true facts 
relating to the above matters. (Heald dep., p. 23, lines 
17-20; Mathesius dep., p. 93). They also recognized that 
the discrepancy in the amount paid Moreton as compared 
with the co-owners put them on notice to "ascertain the 
reason why" (Heald dep., p. 27, lines 4-9). 
Rex Holland and his mother have both testified that 
at the final Ineeting of December 20, 1948, Mathesius 
concealed from the co-owners the contract between Co-
lumbia and 1foreton pretendedly covering the sale of 
jloreton 's purported one-fourth interest and the amount 
that Columbia was paying Moreton for his purported one-
fourth interest, the amount that Columbia was paying 
for the entire property and that Mathesius also concealed 
the revenue stamps which were to be attached to the 
separate deeds (Answers to Interrogatories #50, 51, Clara 
Holland's dep., p. 7) covering the interest of Moreton 
and the interest of the co-owners. 
While Heald and Moreton have both testified that 
~Iathesius did so advise the co-owners, it is interesting 
to note that :Mathesius himself admits that he NEVER 
told the co~owners how much Moreton was getting for 
his one-fourth interest. 
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"Q. And then Mr. Pollack asked you this ques-
tion : 'But you never told them how much 
Moreton was getting?' And you answered: 
'No.' Do you recall that question and answer? 
A. I do." (Mathesius' dep., p. 131, lines 1-5). 
Mathesius likewise would not deny that he had admitted 
to two different persons on two different occasions that 
he did conceal that information from the co-owners 
(Mathesius' dep., p. 127, lines 14-25; p. 128, lines 1-10; 
p. 130, lines 1-25 ; p. 131, lines 1-5). 
Moreton, of course, admits that he never told the co-
owners how much he was getting for the entire property 
(Moreton's dep., p. 336, line 30; p. 337, lines 1, 3, 4). 
"Q ... Did you (Moreton) ever tell them (the 
co-owners) in dollars how much you were 
getting for the entire property? 
A. 
Q. The question is simple. 
A. No." (Moreton's dep., p. 336, line 30; p. 337, 
lines 1, 3, 4) 
"Q. Did you ever tell them (the co-owners) m 
dollars how much you were getting? 
A. I have already answered that. 
Q. Yes or no? 
A. No." (Moreton's dep., p. 161, line 30; p. 162, 
lines 1-4) 
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Thus Columbia acquired the property. Each of the 
prospectors received $33,000.00 for his one-fourth inter-
est in the property. 
Three years later it was discovered and it is now ad-
mitted that Columbia had paid the lawyer pretendedly11 
for his purported one-fourth interest $287,500.00! 
John Holland died on October 9, 1949. l\Ioreton con-
tinued to act as attorney for the Hollands and the Hol-
land estate at least until January, 19·52 (Clara Holland's 
dep., Interrogatories and Answers #55, 56, 57, 58). It 
was not until the following year that Moreton formally 
resigned as their attorney. 
On December 16, 1951, R.ex wrote to Moreton.12 
::\Ioreton answered by letter dated December 18, 1951. 
From this reply, although the exact contents of Rex's 
letter is not apparent, it is clear that Rex had apparently 
just heard rumors regarding the amount of money 
.Moreton had received and that the co-owners had been 
deceived with regard to the tonnage and the value per 
ton and that he wanted an adjustment. l\[oreton ends his 
n Mathesius admits he did not rely on either the purported option 
or ownership agreement (Mathesius' dep., p. 69, lines 17-25; p. 70, 
lines 1-3; p. 79, lines 8-12). 
12 The letter states that he, Rex, had heard rumors that Columbia 
had paid Moreton $287,500.00; that they, the co-owners had agreed 
to take $100,000.00 for their three-fourths interest based upon the 
representations made by Moreton to them before the sale was made 
that there was 1,550,000 tons of ore and that the steel company would 
pay 10 cents per ton for it (Reference to the letter is made on page 
209, lines 7-20 of Moreton's deposition). 
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answering letter by threatening to put Rex in jail if he 
pursues the matter any further. A copy of this letter is 
attached to plaintiffs' amended complaint, (R. 43, 44).13 
The M & H property may be worth in excess of $1,-
000,000.00 (Rex Holland's Affidavit, R. 94; Rex Holland's 
dep., p. 122, lines 28-30; p. 123, lines 1-2). On the basis 
of what Columbia paid Moreton for his purported one-
fourth interest, it was worth $1,150,000.00. 
Later it was learned that Columbia, in the meantime, 
had apparently initiated and consummated two other 
deals with Moreton. In one deal in which Columbia paid 
$50,000.00 for a mine, they paid Moreton $22,000.00 
(Moreton's dep., p. 217, lines 21-28; p. 318, lines 7-9). In 
the second deal in which Columbia paid $250,000.00 for an 
ore property, they paid Moreton the entire $250,000.00 
(:Moreton's dep., p. 318, lines 1-4). 
THE AMENDED COMPLAINT 
The amended complaint is part of the record herein 
by reason of its incorporation by reference into and being 
n1ade a part of Rex Holland's second affidavit. 
1 3 Rex then went to the U. S. Attorney in Salt Lake City to 
determine whether he had violated the law in asking Moreton for an 
adjustment. The U. S. Attorney advised him of his rights and he then 
employed counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel wrote to both Columbia and the 
lawyer requesting information regarding the details of tbe trans-
action. However, both Columbia and the lawyer refused to furnish 
the information to plaintiffs' counsel (Rex Holland's dep., p. 2, lines 
14-19; p. 3, lines 1-16). 
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John Holland died on October 9, 1949, and his son, 
Rex Holland, as the administrator of his estate, is one of 
the plaintiffs. Rex Holland in his individual capacity is 
also a plaintiff. After the investigation of this case was 
begun hy plaintiffs' attorneys :Moreton began to loan 
:Jiurie (one of the co-owners) $250.00 every single month 
up to the present time. (:?\Ioreton's dep., p. 199, lines 5-13, 
24-30; p. 200, lines 1-5). William C. l\iurie now not wish-
ing to be a plaintiff, is nmned as a defendant. 
The amended complaint pleads six causes of action. 
The first is against the .Moretons alone for damages 
for fraud in connection with the fraudulent procurement 
of :\[oreton's purported one-fourth interest. 
The second is against the :Moretons alone for dam-
ages for fraud in connection with plaintiffs' and l\I urie 
receiving only $100,000.00 for their property which was 
worth upwards of $1,150,000.00 and :Moreton in a confi-
dential relationship with them received $287,500 for a 
one-fourth interest. 
The third cause of action is for damages for fraud 
against the corporate defendants and the More'tons, 
which fraud was accomplished by means of a conspiracy 
between the corporate defendants and the Moretons. 
The fourth cause of action is to declare a construC-
tive or resulting trust on behalf of plaintiffs in said prop-
erty. 
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The fifth cause of action is to set aside and cancel 
the deeds to Colun1bia. 
The sixth cause of action is to quiet title to said prop-
erty in plaintiffs. 
GENERAL QUESTION INYOLVED 
The sole question involved herein is ·whether on the 
record herein there EXISTS a single triable issue of fact. 
The crux of this case presents an issue on which there 
is a direct conflict in the testimony. 
Were the co-owners ever informed o.f the amount 
~Ioreton was to receive for his one-fourth interest and 
was it concealed from them~ 
Rex Holland and Clara Holland in their depositions 
testified they were never told. Moreton, Mathesius and 
Heald testified they were informed. Although a number 
of docrnnen ts were signed by the co~ owners at the be-
hest of the defendants, in none of them is there so much 
as a statement of the amount to be received by ~foreton 
for his share. This tends to support the contention of 
the plaintiffs, because with all the signing going on, if 
Moreton and the corporate defendants were in good faith 
seeking to inform the co-owners of the price, it could 
easily have been inserted in one of these many signed 
documents. 
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\VHAT THE FRAUD CONSISTED OF 
1. Concealing fron1 and refusing to advise the co-
owners the correct price per ton that Columbia was pay-
ing for the property and representing that Columbia was 
paying ten cents per ton when in truth and in fact Co-
lumbia was paying between 25 cents and 75 cents per ton. 
If the property \vas in fact worth only $387,500.00 and if 
in fact there were only 1,550,000 tons, then Columbia was 
paying :23 cents per ton. If in fact the property \Vas worth 
$1,150,000.00 and if in fact there were only 1,550,000 tons, 
then Columbia was paying a 1ninimmn of 75 cents per ton. 
2. Concealing from and refusing to advise the co-
owners of the correct tonnage and representing to the co-
owners that the ~1 & H property contained 1,550,000 tons 
of ore when in truth and in fact it contained as much as 
6,000,000 tons of ore. While there is evidence that the 
Jl & H property contained only 1,550,000 tons of ore, 
there is also evidence that the property contained up to 
6,000,000 tons of ore. If the fact of the matter turns 
out to be that the correct tonnage is 1,550,000 there would 
be no fraud in this one respect. However, should it de-
velop that the property contained substantially in excess 
of 1,550,000 tons and perhaps 6,000,000 tons, then there 
would be fraud in this particular respect. At the present 
state .of the record inferences 1nay he drawn either way. 
3. In paying l\foreton almost nine times as much 
pretendedly for his purported one-fourth interest as they 
were paying each of the co-owners for their one-fourth 
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interest, even though they knew that Moreton was tore-
ceive one-fourth of the entire sale price f.or his purported 
one-fourth interest and even though the only negotiations 
allegedly carried on provided f.or the sale of the entire 
property figured on the basis of 25 cents per ton for 
1,550,000 tons or $387,500.00, and even though there 
were no separate negotiations, pretended or actual, for 
t'he sale of his purported one-fourth interest. 
4. The corporate defendants through :Mathesius 
and Heald recognized that they should advise the eo-
owners of the amount received by Moreton for his one-
fourth interest, yet they did not disclose to them such 
amount and they were never advised thereof and by such 
failure they enabled Moreton to perpetrate the fraud 
and by preparing two sets of papers and working only 
through Moreton they actively participated in 1\.foreton~s 
defrauding of the co-owners. 
THE SPECIFIC RESPECTS IN WHICH THE 
CORPORATE DEF'ENDANTS PARTICIPATED IN 
THE ACC01fPLISHMENT OF THE FRAUD AND 
OTHER EVIDENCE OF SUCH PARTICIPATION. 
The corporate defendants: 
1. Instigated the conspiracy and the scheme to de-
fraud the co-owners by: 
(a) advising Moreton that Columbia was contem-
plating the purchase of the Milner property (Mathesius' 
dep., p. 7, lines 16-20). 
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(b) advising Moreton that if Columbia purchased 
the _Milner property, it, Columbia, would be interested 
in acquiring theM & H property (Mathesius' dep., p. 7, 
lines 14-25; p. 8, lines 1-3). 
(c) instructing Moreton to contact the co-owners 
and to suggest to the co-owners that they, the co-mvners, 
employ Moreton as their attorney for the purpose of get-
ting the claims patented (Mathesius' dep., p. 8, lines 5-6; 
p. 50, lines 8-17). 
2. Advised :Moreton that they had acquired the 
:Jiilner property (:Mathesius' dep., p. 7, lines 23-24). 
3. Instructed Moreton to contact the co-owners and 
to get the co-owners to appoint Moreton as the co-owners' 
agent in the sale of the property (Mathesius' dep., p. 50, 
lines 8-17). 
4. Concealed from the co-owners the fact that Co-
lumbia was intending to purchase or had purchased the 
:Milner property and the effect thereof on the value of 
the ~I & H property. 
5. Concealed the fact that they had given Moreton 
information regarding the price they were willing to pay 
for it. 
6. Concealed from the co-owners the fact that they 
had directed Moreton to contact them and offer his ser-
vices to them and to suggest to them that he, Moreton, 
patent their claims. 
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7. Concealed frmn and refused to advise the co-
owners of the correct price per ton that Columbia was 
paying for the property and represented that Columbia 
was paying ten cents per ton and that the value of the ore 
was ten or twelve and a half cents per ton (Moreton's 
dep., p. 70), when in truth and in fact Columbia was pay-
ing between 25 cents and 75 cents per ton. If the property 
was in fact worth only $387,500.00 and if in fact there 
were only 1,555,000 tons, then Columbia was paying 25 
cents per ton. If the property was in fact worth $1,150,-
000.00 and if in fact there were only 1,550,000 tons, then 
Columbia was paying a minimum of 75 cents per ton 
(Moreton's dep., p. 139, lines 29-30; p. 140, lines 1-2, 13-
16; p. 160, lines 8-13, 27-30; p. 161, lines 1-24; p. 152, lines 
9-25; Mathesius' dep., p. 127, lines 14-25; p. 128, lines 1-
10; p. 130, lines 1-25; p. 131, lines 1-5). 
8. Concealed from and refused to advise the co-
owners of the correct tonnage and represented to the co-
owners that the l\f & H property contained 1, 550,000 tons 
of ore, when in truth and in fact it contained as much as 
6,000,000 tons of ore. While there is evidence that the 
M & H property contained only 1,550,000 tons of ore, 
there is also evidence that the property contained up to 
6,000,000 tons of ore. If the fact of the matter turns out 
to be that the correct tonnage is 1,550,000, there would be 
no fraud in this one respect. However, should it develop 
that the property contained substantially in excess of 
1,500,000 tons and perhaps 6,000,000 tons, then there 
would be fraud in this respect. At the present state of 
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the record inferences may be drawn either way (More-
ton's dep., p. 139, lines 29-30; p. 140, lines 1-2, 13-16; p. 
160, lines 8-13; 27-30; p. 161, lines 1-24; p. 152, lines 
9-25; Thlathesius' dep., p. 127, lines 1-25; p. 128, lines 1-10; 
p. 130, lines 1-25; p. 131, lines 1-5). 
9. Pretended that the alleged negotiations for the 
purchase and sale of the M & H properties allegedly 
consisting of only 25-35 words exchanged by Mathesius 
and Moreton in one telephone conversation were bona 
fide, when as a matter of fact said alleged negotiations 
were no1t bona fide but merely pretended.14 
14 According to Moreton, he, Moreton, had a total of only two or 
three talks, including telephone conversations, with Mathesius regard-
ing the M & H property before the meeting of December 20, 1948 
(Moreton's dep., p. 254, lines 13-17; 29-31; p. 255, lines 1-2). At the 
first meeting, according to Mathesius, .Mathesius told Moreton to con-
tact the co-owners and suggest to them about patenting their claims 
(Mathesius' dep., p. 8, lines 5-6; p. 50, lines 8-17). In the second 
talk, Mathesius told Moreton that Columbia had purchased the Milner 
claim and that when the patents came through from the U. S. govern-
ment, he would discuss the purchase of the M & H property. So 
that leaves only one meeting which Moreton says took place over the 
telephone (Moreton's dep., p. 268, lines 29-30; p. 269, line 11) around 
October 1, 1948, where the sale of the property was discussed and 
that entire conversation consisted of Mathesius' offering to buy the 
M & H properties for 25 cents per ton based upon Columbia's estimate 
of the tonnage, and .Moreton's answering "Yes" to that suggestion 
(Moreton's dep., p. 267, lines 29-30; p. 268, line 3; p. 137, line 30 
through p. 38, line 4). In other words, the entire transaction consisted 
of a maximum of 25-35 words! This we feel is strong evidence of a 
conspiracy and a working together and collusion or prearrangement 
between Moreton and Mathesius. It is inconceivable that there would 
not be more negotiating; that Moreton would not realize that even 
though Columbia had paid 25 cents per ton for the Milner property, 
that that price might be low; that Columbi·a might conceivably be 
willing to pay more for an adjoining piece. At least was it not worth 
a try on Moreton's part to get mol'e money and isn't that how business 
is usually conducted? 
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Actually there were no negotiations at all. :Moreton 
testified that Mathesius, around October 1, 1948, on the 
telephone stated that Columbia would pay 25 cents a ton, 
based upon Columbia's estimate of the tonnage, to which 
1Ioreton replied that that would be agreeable with him: 
"A He (Mathesius) said that they would be 
willing to pay twenty-five cents per ton upon 
the estimate that Mr. Sargis might come up 
with after he had completed his making his 
survey and his notes. 
Q What did you say~ 
A. I said that would be agreeable." (Moreton's 
dep., p. 137, line 30, through p. 138, line 4; 
See also, Moreton's dep., p. 269, lines 14-16; 
p. 270, lines 10-11; p. 273, lines 5-18). 
10. Did not carry on bona fide negotiations for the 
purchase of the M: & H property. 
11. Even though Mathesius did not know who was 
lying and who was telling the truth at that time after 
receiving Rex's letter (Mathesius' dep., p. 10, lines 1-2), 
refused to discuss the matter with the co-owners or even 
con tact them. 
12. Refused to deal directly with Rex even though 
Mathesius considered Moreton merely a co-owner 
(Mathesius' dep., p.147, lines 4-7). 
13. Asked only Moreton for a conference after 
receipt of Rex's letter of September 14, 1948, for the 
purpose of discussing it (l\fathesius' dep., p. 58, lines 
17-19). 
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14. Held a meeting with Moreton in Moreton's 
office regarding the contents of Rex's letter (Mathesius' 
dep., p. 60, lines -l:-5; p. 66, lines 4-5; :Moreton's dep., p. 
134, lines 23-30). 
15. Gave ~Ioreton a carbon copy of Rex's letter 
(.~[oreton's dep., p. 134, lines 21-22). 
16. Did not discuss \Vith .l\Ioreton the statement in 
Rex's letter that :Moreton was to receive only one-fourth 
of the total amount of 1noney that Columbia was paying 
for the property (:Mathesius' dep., p. 86, lines 8-15). 
17. Did not inquire of :Jloreton at all as to the 
circumstances under which the co-owners signed the 
agreement of ownership or the option (.~Iathesius' dep., 
p. 68, lines 18-:23 ; p. 70, lines 6-10) nor of any other 
phase of the relationship between Moreton and the co-
owners (:J[athesius' dep., p. 70, lines 6-10). 
18. Agreed with Moreton not to answer and did 
not answer at all Rex's letter, knowing that such failure 
would leave Rex without any other place to inquire 
regarding the amount of money Columbia was paying 
for the entire property or the basis of computing the 
price thereof (Mathesius' dep., p. 65, lines 16-18; p. 66, 
lines 4-5, 8-9). 
19. Agreed with Moreton not to answer and did 
not answer Rex's letter, knowing that such failure and 
refusal would leave Rex without any other place to in-
quire regarding the division of the proceeds of the sale 
of the property, would cause Rex to believe that the 
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infonnation he had obtained was erroneous and without 
basis 'and would, therefore, give the effect of restoring 
Rex Holland's confidence in his attorney, :Moreton 
(Mathesius' dep., p. 65, lines 16-18; p. 66, line's 4-5, 8-9). 
20. Agreed with l\1:oreton not to advise the co-
owners and did not advise and concealed from the co-
owners the price per ton that Colun1bia was paying for 
the ore, even though they knew Rex did not know how 
1nuch that was. 
21. Agreed with l\{oreton not to advise the co-
owners and did not advise and concealed from the co-
owners how much they were paying for the entire prop-
erty, even though they knew that the co-owners did not 
know the correct sale price of the entire property and 
even though Rex had told them in his letter that Moreton 
was to receive only one-fourth of the total amount that 
Colun1bia was paying for the property and that it was, 
therefore, necessary for Rex to know the total mnount 
Columbia was paying. 
22. Agreed with :Moreton to conceal and concealed 
from the co-owners the amount of money Columbia was 
paying Moreton pretendedly for his purported one-
fourth interest, even though Rex had told them in his 
letter that Moreton was to receive one-fourth of the total 
amount that Columbia was paying for the property and 
that it was, therefore, necessary for Rex to know the 
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total anwunt Columbia was paying and even though 
~Iathesius knew that Rex \Yas claiming that he was not 
getting a fair share out of the property. 
23. Destroyed the original single contract that 
covered the purchase and sale of the entire property and 
which recited the total price that Columbia was paying 
for the property (Heald's dep., p. 16, line 29; p. 17, 
lines 1-10, 16-2-±; p. 37, lines 8-10). 
2+. Departed from their customary practice of 
accepting just one offer to sell for each property they 
wished to acquire and accepted two separate offers of 
sale p.Iathesius' dep., p. 9:2, lines 8-11), one to the co-
owners and one to .Moreton. The former recited only 
the a1nount of money the co-owners were offering to 
take for their three-fourths interest. 
25. Never raised the question as to why they were 
using two such separate offers of sale for the one piece 
of property (:Jiathesius' dep., p. 92, lines 8-11). 
26. Departed fr01n their usual customary practice 
of having one contract and one deed and substituted 
therefor two separate contracts and two separate deeds, 
one contract and one deed for the co-owners and one 
contract and one deed for the :Jloretons. The first con-
tract recited the amount of money Columbia was paying 
the co-owners; the second recited the amount of money 
Columbia was paying the Moretons. Because they would 
not see :\[oreton's separate contract, the co-owners would 
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not know and would be unable to ascertain how 1nuch 
Columbia was paying for the entire property or how 
much Columbia was paying 1\Ioreton pretendedly for 
his purported one-fourth interest (Heald's dep. p. 
14, lines 17-18; p. 15, lines 3-6; Moreton's dep., p. 281, 
lines 26-27). 
27. Directed Moreton to secure the signatures of 
the co~owners to the letter of October 16, 194815 C~iore­
ton's dep., p. 139, lines 29-30; p. 140, lines 1-2, 13-16, 18-21; 
p. 160, lines 8-13, 27-30; p. 161, lines 1-2 p. 281, lines 
27-30; p. 282, lines 1-12; Mathesius' dep., p. 70, lines 20-
25; p. 71lines 1-5; p. 76, lines 5-8 p. 79, lines 18-20; p. 93, 
lines 11-18; p. 11, lines 9-12; Defendants' Exhibit #8, 
Rex Holland's deposition, Appendix B; see footnote 
15, this brief). 
This letter : 
a. fraudulently implies that Moreton has not yet 
decided to sell or has not yet sold his one-fourth interest 
in the property. 
15 The letters of October 16, 1948, and November 20, 1948, were 
part of the scheme to defraud the co-owners. It was probably thought 
that those letters would preclude the co-owners from maintaining an 
action for fraud such as this against the corporate defendants and at 
the same time read in such a way that the co-owners would not be 
told or suspect the real f,acts. The signatures of the co-owners, two 
of whom had never heard anything other than that the property was 
worth $133,000.00, or perhaps a little more, were obtained by Moreton 
at the behest of Mathesius, with full knowledge that all three of the 
co-owners were uninformed and misinformed regarding the value of 
the property, the total amount that Columbia was paying for the 
entire property, the amount of money Columbia was paying Moreton 
presumably for his purported one-fourth interest and in the belief 
that Moreton was going to receive one-fourth or a little more of 
the total amount Columbia was paying for the property. 
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" ... Mr. :Moreton may offer and sell his interest 
... if he so desires ... " 
b. fraudulently implies that :Moreton and Mathesius 
are still negotiating for the separate sale and purchase 
of Moreton's one-fourth interest. 
c. fraudulently implies that they had not as yet 
agreed upon the price Columbia would pay Moreton 
presumably for that purported one-fourth interest. 
d. fraudulently conceals the fact that they ha:d 
already agreed upon a price that Columbia would pay for 
the entire property. 
e. fraudulently conceals the price that Columbia had 
agreed to pay for the entire property. 
f. fraudulently conceals the price per ton that they 
had already agreed to pay for the entire tonnage. 
g. fraudulently conceals the amount of money they 
had already agreed to pay Moreton pretendedly for his 
purported one-fourth interest. 
28. Directed Moreton to secure the signatures of 
tlie co-owners to the letter of November 20, 1948 (More-
ton's dep., p. 139, lines 29-30; p. 140, lines 1-2, lines 13-16, 
18-21; p. 160, lines 8-13, 27-30; p. 161, lines 1-24; p. 281, 
lines 27-30; p. 282, lines 1-12; (Mathesius' dep. p. 70, lines 
20-25; p. 71, lines 1-5; p. 76, lines 5-8; p. 79, lines 18-20; 
p. 93, lines 11-18; p. 11, lines 9-12; Defendants' Exhibit 
#9, Rex Holland's deposition, Appendix C, see footnote 11, 
this brief). 
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This letter : 
a. implies that l\1athesius and Moreton had negoti-
ated for the sale and purchase of only the three-fourths 
interest of the co-ownerG when as a matter of fact the 
negotiations allegedly covered only the price Columbia 
would pay for the entire property. 
b. implies that Mathesius and Moreton had agreed 
on the price of $100,000.00 for the three-fourths interest 
of the co-owners as a result of a separate agreement. 
c. conceals the fact that there was presumably only 
one deal ever discussed or agreed upon, which deal cover-
ed the entire property. 
d. implies that Moreton has not yet decided to sell 
or has not yet sold his one-fourth interest in the property. 
" ... it is no concern of ours as to when ... he 
may sell his interest ... " 
e. implies that Moreton may decide to sell his pur-
ported one-fourth interest to someone other than Col-
umbia. 
" ... it is no concern of ours as ... to whom he 
1nay sell his interest ... " 
f. implies that :Moreton is still negotiating for the 
separate sale of his purported one-fourth interest. 
g. implies that he an Mathesius had not yet agreed 
upon the price that Columbia would pay Moreton pre-
sumably for his purported one-fourth interest. 
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h. conceals the fact that they had already agreed 
upon a price that Columbia would pay for the entire 
property. 
i. conceals the price per ton that they had already 
agreed to pay for the property. 
j. conceals the total price that Columbia had agreed 
to pay for the entire property. 
k. conceals the amount of money they had already 
agreed to pay Moreton presumably for his purported 
one-fourth interest. 
29. M:athesius never asked l\foreton to furnish him 
\vith a statement from the co-owners stating they under-
stood how 1nuch :Moreton was getting (Mathesius' dep., p. 
94, lines 12-19; p. 139, lines 7-10). 
30. Mathesius never asked Moreton whether he 
(l\Ioreton) was acting as attorney for or agent of the 
co- owners (_~Ioreton's dep., p. 271, lines 2-6). 
31. Mathesius never asked Moreton whether More-
ton had advised the co-owners of the correct price per 
ton that Columbia was paying for the ore (Mathesius,' 
dep., p. 97, line's 9-14; p. 137, lines 8-19). 
32. Columbia never asked the co-owners whether 
they knew how much Moreton was getting for his interest 
(::\Iathesius' dep., p. 137, lines 20-23) or whether they 
knew how much per ton Columbia was paying for the ore 
(.J.Iathesius' dep., p. 138, lines 17-20). 
33. Mathesius never told Moreton to tell the co-
owners the price per ton that Columbia was paying for 
the ore (Moreton's dep., p. 287, lines 4-7). 
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34. Mathesius instructed Moreton to direct the 
co-owners to be at Moreton's office for the closing of the 
deal on December 20, 1948. Mathesius presided over 
this meeting (Mathesius' dep., p. 15, lines 20-23). 
35. Columbia never ascertained why Moreton was 
entitled to more than one-fourth (l\foreton's dep., p. 282, 
lines 21-23). 
36. Columbia paid Moreton $287,500.00 even though 
they had been told in or could tell from the contents of 
Rex's letter of September 14, 1948, that the agreement of 
ownership and the option had both been signed by the 
co-owners on Moreton's representations that he was to 
get one-fourth of the amount of money Columbia was 
paying for the entire property. 
37. Concealed the fact that Columbia was paying 
Moreton $287,500.00 pretendedly for Moreton's purported 
one-fourth interest (Clara Holland"s dep., Interrogatories 
and Answers #37, 38, p. 5; #39, 40, 46, 47; p. 6, #48, 49, p. 
7).16 
16 It is conceded by both .Mathesius and Moreton that they agreed 
between them not to advise and to conceal from the co-owners the total 
.amount of money that Columbia was paying for the entire property, 
the amount of money Columbia was paying Moreton pretendedly for 
his purported one-fourth interest in the property. Moreton takes 
the position that the co-owners were not entitled to have the informa-
tion, while Mathesius admits that the co-owners were entitled to 
have that information (Mathesius dep. p. 93; Heald's dep., p. 23, lines 
17-20) ·and that he intended to give them that information at the 
time the deal was closed in Moreton's office on December 20, 1948 
(Moreton's dep., p. 152, lines 11-14; p. 154; p. 155). 'Rex Holland 
and his mother, Clara Holland, have both testified that he did not 
give the co-owners any such information. 
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38. At the closing of the deal, :.Mathesius waited 
for the co-owners to leave before affixing revenue stamps 
to the separate deeds (Clara Holland's deposition, Inter-
rogatories and Answers thereto #50, 51). He put three 
times as much revenue stmnps on one deed as on the 
other.17 
39. :.Jiathesius would not deny that in his own office 
1n Chicago, Illinois, on November 3, 1952, he told Nick 
Spanos, one of the lawyers for the plaintiffs, that he 
never told the co-owners how much money Moreton was 
getting for his one-fourth interest in the property because 
it was none of their business (Mathesius' dep., p. 101, 
lines :22-:25; p. 102, lines 5-6; p. 104, lines 3-6, lines 15-17). 
40. In a telephone conversation with Mr. Pollack, 
one of the attorneys for plaintiffs, l\lathesius admitted 
that he never advised the co-owners of the total amount 
of money Columbia was paying for the property or the 
amount they were paying 3.Ioreton presumably for his 
purported one-fourth interest (p. 127, lines 14-25; p. 131, 
lines 12-17, page 128, lines 1-10; p. 130, lines 1-25). 
-!1. :Jiathesius at the direction of Columbia attempt-
ed to suppress the telephone conversation with Mr. 
Pollack (~Iathesius' dep., Exhibits #6 and 7; p. 119, lines 
1-25; p. 122 lines 23-25; p. 123, lines 1-10; p. 128; p. 118, 
11 If Mathesius had placed the revenue stamps on both deeds 
while the co-owners were in the office, they may have noticed it and 
if they knew that revenue stamps reflect consideration they may 
have found out they were being imposed upon. 
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lines 23-25; p. 120, lines 15-25; p. 121, lines 1-G), even 
though the answers he gave ~Ir. Pollack's question were 
correct (l\Iathesius' dep., p. 123, lines 22-24). 
42. 1\f.athesius finally admittted that he never told 
the co-owners how 1nuch Moreton was getting for his one-
fourth interest (~Iathesius' dep., p. 131, lines 1-5). 
43. l\fathesius, while afraid to deny that he had 
admitted several tilnes to the lawyers for the plaintiffs 
that he had concealed that information from the co-
owners (Mathesius' dep., p. 104, lines 3-6; 15-17; p. 127, 
lines 1-!-25; p. 131, lines 1-5, 12-17; p. 128, lines 1-10; p. 
130, lines 1-25; p. 131, lines 12-17) testifying frmn prepar-
ed notes (Mathesius' dep., p. 26, lines 3-11), now untruth-
fully claims that he did give the co-owners that informa-
tion. 
44. Colun1bia collaborated with the U. S. Steel 
Corporation, exchanging opinions, advice, inforrnation, 
and recomrnendations to con1plete the deal (l\Iathesius' 
dep., p. 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 41). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS. RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN AN 
ACTION BASED ON A COMPLEX SCHEME OF FRAUD, IN-
VOLVING LENGTHY AFFIDAVITS, DOCUMENTS AND 
VOLUMINOUS DEPOSITIONS. 
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POINT II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC REMEDY AND 
SHOULD BE DENIED IF THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST 
DOUBT AS TO THE FACTS. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT IN RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE MADE AN ORDER INDI.CAT-
ING WHICH FACTS WERE AND WHICH WERE NOT 
CONTROVERTED. 
POINT IV. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE DENIED IF THERE 
IS A SINGLE TRIABLE ISSUE. 
POINT V. 
IN DETERMINING WHETHER A TRIABLE ISSUE EX-
ISTS, THE COURT MUST ACCEPT AS TRUE ALL FACTS 
ALLEGED IN AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
POINT VI. 
FACTS ALLEGED IN AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NEED NOT 
NECESSARILY BE COMPOSED OF STRICTLY EVIDENTI-
ARY FA.CTS. 
POINT VII. 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE PARTY MOVING FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
POINT VIII. 
THE AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY 
CONSTRUED. 
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POINT IX. 
NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF A CONSPIRACY. 
POINT X. 
THE GRAVAMEN OF THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES 
FOR CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD IS THE CIVIL WRONG 
WHICH RESULTS IN DAMAGE. 
POINT XI. 
WHERE, AS IN THE CASE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT, 
A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND ·CONFIDENCE EXISTS, 
THERE IS A DUTY ON THE PART OF THE ATTORNEY 
TO DISCLOSE ALL MATERIAL FACTS AND FAILURE TO 
DO SO CONSTITUTES FRAUD. 
POINT XII. 
A PERSON WHO NEGOTIATES A PURCHASE OF LAND 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS, BEING 
THE AGENT OF HIS ASSOCIATES, IS BOUND AS SUCH 
TO THE UTMOST GOOD FAITH WITH THEM, REGARD-
LESS OF WHETHER THE DEALINGS CONSTITUTED A 
TENANCY IN COMMON OR A PARTNERSHIP. 
POINT XIII. 
CONCEALMENT OF A MATERIAL FACT ·CONVEYING 
A FALSE IMPRESSION ON THE MIND OF THE OTHER 
PARTY WILL SUPPORT AN ACTION IN FRAUD. 
POINT XIV. 
AN ACTION WILL LIE AGAINST PARTIES WHO CON-
SPIRE WITH AN AGENT TO DEFRAUD THE LATTER'S 
PRINCIPAL, EVEN THOUGH THEY THEMSELVES ARE 
NOT FIDUCIARIES. 
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POINT XV. 
CONSPIRATORS ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY 
LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE CON-
SPIRACY, EACH BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE A.CTS 
OF THE OTHER IN FURTHERANCE OF THE COMMON 
DESIGN. 
POINT XVI. 
A CO-CONSPIRATOR IS LIABLE FOR ALL OVERT ACTS 
COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY, 
WHETHER HE JOINED WILLINGLY OR UNWILLINGLY 
OR WHETHER HE WAS AN ACTIVE P ARTI.CIP ANT OR 
NOT. 
POINT XVII. 
PERSONS COMING IN AFTER FORMATION OF CON-
SPIRACY ARE LIABLE FOR ALL ACTS PREVIOUSLY OR 
SUBSEQUENTLY DONE IN PURSUANCE THEREOF. 
POINT XVIII. 
A CONSPIRATOR IS LIABLE EVEN THOUGH HE EX-
PECTED TO RECEIVE NO BENEFIT AND IN FACT RE-
CEIVED NO BENEFIT. 
POINT XIX. 
EVIDENCE OF OTHER SIMILAR FRAUDS MAY BE 
SHOWN TO PROVE A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A PAR-
TICULAR FRAUD. 
POINT XX. 
ONE CONSPIRATOR, ALTHOUGH UNCORROBORATED, 
IS A COMPETENT WITNESS AGAINST A CO-CONSPIRA-
TOR. 
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POINT XXI. 
WHERE A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION EXISTS, NOTH-
ING SHORT OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE WILL PREVENT 
RE.COVERY FOR MISREPRESENTATION. 
POINT XXII. 
THE MERE FACT THAT SUSPICIONS ARE AROUSED 
BY STATEMENTS OF THIRD PERSONS DOES NOT PRE-
CLUDE RECOVERY FOR A MISREPRESENTATION AC-
TUALLY RELIED UPON. 
POINT XXIII. 
THE RULE REQUIRING INVESTIGATION CANNOT BE 
INVOKED BY A THIRD PERSON IN COLLUSION WITH 
ONE HAVING A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION WITH THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
POINT XXIV. 
EVEN THOUGH MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE OR IN-
VESTIGATION ARE OPEN TO ONE, NO DUTY RESTS UPON 
ONE TO SO EMPLOY SUCH MEANS OR KNOWLEDGE 
WHERE HE IS JUSTIFIED IN RELYING UPON THE 
REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO HIM. 
POINT XXV. 
A PERSON MAY RELY UPON ONE WHO ACTUALLY 
DEFRAUDED HIM WHERE HIS CONDUCT IN LIGHT OF 
HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION WAS NOT 
UNREASONABLE AND MAY RECOVER FOR THE FRAUD. 
POINT XXVI. 
A PERSON TO WHOM A FALSE REPRESENTATION 
IS MADE IS NOT HELD TO CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A 
PUBLIC RECORD WHICH WOULD REVEAL THE TRUE 
FACTS. 
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POINT XXVII. 
ESTOPPELS ARE NOT FAVORED BY THE LAW. 
POINT XXVIII. 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE DENIED WHEN THE VERY QUES-
TION OF ESTOPPEL PRESENTS A FACTUAL ISSUE. 
POINT XXIX. 
A PARTY IS NOT ESTOPPED BY A WRITTEN INSTRU-
MENT WHI.CH HE IS INDUCED BY THE FRAUD OF THE 
OTHER PARTY TO EXECUTE. 
POINT XXX. 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE IN-
VOKED BY ANY PARTY GUILTY OF FRAUD. 
POINT XXXI. 
ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE RELIED UPON SO AS TO 
CREATE LIABILITY WHERE AGENT ACTING SOLELY FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF HIS PRINCIPAL ACTIVELY PARTICI-
PATED IN THE DECEIT AND FRAUD AND SOLICITED 
THE A.CT FROM THE PERSON SOUGHT TO BE ESTOPPED 
BY THE PRINCIPAL. 
POINT XXXII. 
ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE USED AS A SHIELD 
AGAINST THE RESULTS OF FRAUD, WRONGFUL OR ANY 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN THE TRANSACTIONS. 
POINT XXXIII. 
ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON AS A DE-
FENSE AGAINST A FRAUDULENT PLAN OR AN AT-
TEMPT TO DEFRAUD IN WHICH PARTY CLAIMING ES-
TOPPEL WAS ACTIVE PARTICIPANT. 
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POINT XXXIV. 
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BASED ON CONDUCT OR 
REPRESENTATIONS INDUCED BY FRAUDULENT .CON-
CEALMENT OF PARTY CLAIMING IT MAY NOT BE IN-
VOKED. 
POINT XXXV. 
ESTOPPEL IS NOT APPLIED TO PENALIZE AN IN-
NOCENT PARTY WHO HAS BEEN MISLED TO HIS MA-
TERIAL PREJUDICE. 
POINT XXXVI. 
FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE REAL FACTS AT THE 
TIME OF THE CONCEALMENT, REPRESENTATION OR 
OTHER CONDUCT OF THE PARTY CLAIMING THE ES-
TOPPEL IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF ESTOP-
PEL. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS NOT APPROPRIATE IN AN 
ACTION BASED ON A COMPLEX SCHEME OF FRAUD, IN-
VOLVING LENGTHY AFFIDAVITS, DOCUMENTS AND 
VOLUMINOUS DEPOSITIONS. 
Schultz v. Manufacturers Traders Tru.st Co., 3 F. 
R. Serv. 56c 41, 1 F'.R.D. 451 (1940) 
In the Shultz case, the Court said: 
."In my opinion, the procedure for summary 
judgment provided by the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure was not intended to function in 
such a com plica ted case. The transactions which 
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form the basis of the complaints and decedent's 
knowledge of them are entirely too involved to 
be disposed of in a summary manner. This is 
not a case where documentary evidence alone is 
made the basis of the relief asked. The granting 
of a summary judgJ.nent is a drastic remedy." 
Here we have a complicated and complex scheme of 
fraud. There is hopeless conflict and confusion as to 
many dates. Involved are an option alleged by defendant 
to be lost but which plaintiffs claim never existed; a 
second option ·which does not recite the amount of money 
to be paid by the purchaser; a third option which is un-
dated; an agreement of ownership obtained by the fraud 
of a fiduciary, which recites in one place that Moreton 
has a one-fourth intere·st in the property and in another 
place that he is to get all over $133,000.00 but no reason 
for his getting more than one-fourth of the proceeds; 
another instrument prepared by Moreton, dated after 
the agreement of ownership, which indicates that More-
ton has no interest at all in the property; an offer of sale 
which does not recite the total purchase price, which 
recites a certain amount of tonnage but which omits the 
price per ton being paid; Rex Holland's letter of Sept-
tember 14, 1948, inquiring as to the tonnage and the price 
per ton that Columbia was intending to pay and notifying 
Columbia that :Moreton is to get one-fourth and the co-
owners three-fourths of the purchase price; the letters 
of October 16, 1948, and November, 20, 1948 which were 
secured by reason of the fraudulent implicationf', rep-
resentations and concealments. 
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There are many other documents, all of which require 
explanation. There are about 1000 pages of transcript 
and about 55 pages of affidavit, including the 41 page 
amended complaint which has been incorporated by 
reference and made a part of Rex Holland's second af-
fidavit. 
The language and holding of the above cited case 
obviously is particularly applicable to the instant case. 
POINT II. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS A DRASTIC REMEDY AND 
SHOULD BE DENIED IF THERE IS THE SLIGHTEST 
DOUBT AS TO THE FACTS. 
Peckham v. Ronrico Corp., 171 Fed. (2d) 653 
(1948) 
Doehler Metal Furniture v. United Sta.tes, 149 
. Fed. (2d) 130, 8 F.R. Serv. 56c Case 6 (1945) 
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mcintosh, 112 Cal. 
App. (2d) 177, 245 P. (2d) 1065 (1952) 
Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal. (2d) 439; 116 P. (2d) 
62 (1941) 
Schultz v. Manufacturers Traders Trust Co., 
3 F.R. S.erv. 56c 41, 1 F.R.D. 451 (1940) 
6 Moore's Federal Practice, section 56.15. 
In the Shultz case, the Court said: 
" ... The granting of a summary judgment is a 
drastic remedy." 
In the Walsh case, the Court, at page 444, stated: 
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"The sumrnary judgment statute is drastic and 
its purpose is not to provide a substitute for 
existing methods in the trial of issues of fact.'' 
In the Doehler case, supra, Justice Frank of the 
Second Circuit: 
"We take this occasion to suggest that 
trial judges should exercise great care in grant-
ing motions for summary judgment. A litigant 
has a right to a trial where there is the slightest 
doubt as to the facts, and a denial of that right 
is reviewable; but refusal to grant a summary 
judgment is not reviewable. Such a judgment, 
widely used, is a praiseworthy time saving device. 
But, although prompt dispatch of judicial bus-
iness is a virtue, it is neither the sole nor the 
primary purpose for which courts have been 
established. Denial of a trial on disputed facts 
is worse than delay The District 
Courts would do well to note that time has often 
been lost by reversals of summary judgments 
improperly entered." 
POINT III. 
THE COURT IN RULING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT SHOULD HAVE MADE AN ORDER INDI·CAT-
ING WHICH FACTS WERE AND WHICH WERE NOT 
CONTROVERTED. 
Rule 36 (d)- "Duty To illake Order As To Iss1tes". 
rrhe court at the hearing on the motion is under a duty, 
so far as performance is practicable, to rnake an order 
~tating what issues are and are not in good faith con-
troverted. 
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This the court did not do. We are and always have 
been at a cmnplete loss to know the basis of the court's 
ruling. 
POINT IV. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MUST BE DENIED IF THERE 
IS A SINGLE TRIABLE ISSUE. 
. The primary duty of a trial judge is to determine 
whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. If he finds 
one, he is then powerless to proceed further. Issue 
finding rather than issue a:etermination is pivot upon 
which summary judgment law turns. 
Walsh v. Walsh, 18 Cal. (2d) 439, 116 P. (2d) 
62 (1941); 
Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Pren.tice, 19 Cal. (2d) 
553 (1942), 122 P. (2d) 264; 
Sa;nford Co. v. Cory Glass Coffee Brewer Co., 
85 Cal. App. (2d) 724, 194 P. (2d) 127 (1948); 
Gibson v. De La Salle Institute, 66 Cal. App. (2d) 
609, 152 P. (2d) 774 (1944). 
In the Walsh case, supra, the court below granted 
the motion for sununary judgment. 
On appeal, this was reversed, the court, at page 441, 
holding: 
"Thus, in passing upon a motion for summary 
judgment, the primary duty of the trial court is 
to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be 
tried. If it finds one, it is then powerless to pro-
ceed further, but must allow such issue to be tried 
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by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. By an un-
broken line of decision in this state since the date 
of the original enactment of seetion 437 c, the prin-
ciple has become well established that issue find-
ing rather than issue determination is the pivot 
upon which summary judgment law turns (Se-
curity First Na.tional Bank v. Cryer, 39 C.A. 2nd 
757, 104 P. 2nd 66); (McComsey v. Leaf, 36 Cal. 
App. 2nd 132, 97 P. 2nd 242; Kelly v. Liddicoa.t, 
35 Cal. App. 2nd 599, 96 P. 2nd 186; Shea v. 
Leon is, 29 Cal. A pp. 2nd 984, 84 P. 2nd 277 ; 
B(Jfnk of America v. Casady, 15 Cal. App. 2nd 163, 
59 P. 2nd 444). As was said in Shea v. Leonis, 
supra, at p. 187: 'A motion for summary judg-
ment is not a trial upon the merits. It is merely 
to determine whether there is an issue to be tried.' 
The same thought was expressed in Bank of 
America v. Casady, supra, at p. 168: 'If an issue 
of fact is raised, then a summ·ary judgment is im-
proper, and the case must proceed to trial. (citing 
cases)' In McComsey v. Leaf, supra, the court 
by an extensive review of leading authorities 
from other states wherein provision had been 
made for the award of summary relief, gives 
striking demonstration of the universal practice 
to permit this expedited procedure only where 
it is perfectly plain that there is no substantial 
issue to be tried. Illustrative of this view is the 
following quotation from Dwan. v. Massarene, 
199 App. Div. 872, (192 N. Y. S. 577, 582), a 
well-considered and widely cited New York case 
which limits itself strictly to a discussion of the 
summary judgment rules: 'The court is not au-
thorized to try the issue but is to determine 
whether there is an issue to be tried. If there is, 
it must be tried by a jury.' " 
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POINT V. 
IN DETERMINING WHETHER A TRIABLE ISSUE EX-
ISTS, THE COURT MUST ACCEPT AS TRUE ALL FACTS 
ALLEGED IN AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION TO SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
In passing upon the motion, the court must find 
that the facts alleged in the affidavits in opposition 
thereto are accepted as true. 
Eagle Oil & Ref'ining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. (2d) 
553, 122 P. (2d) 264 (1942); 
Sanford Co. v. Cory Glass etc. Co., 85 Cal. App. 
(2d) 724, 194 P. (2d) 127 (1940); 
Strauss v. Strauss, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 757, 203 P. 
(2d) 857 (1949); 
The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mcintosh, 112 
Cal. App. (2d) 177, 245 P. (2d) 1065 (1952). 
In the Sanford: case, the court, at page 731, said: 
". . . for the purpose of the motion the better 
rule is that the facts alleged in the affidavit of the 
party against whom the motion is made must be 
accepted as true ... " 
In the Strauss case, supra, the plaintiff brought an 
action on a judg1nent of a sister state. The defendant 
denied that he had ever been served. The plaintiff made 
a motion for summary judgment and the court granted 
it. On appeal the court reversed the lower tribunal, 
stating that the defendant had a right to show that he had 
never been served and that the judgment as to him is a 
nullity. At page 759, the Court said: 
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"In passing upon the motion, the facts alleged 
in the affidavit of the parties against wh01n it 
is made, must be accepted as true " 
POINT VI. 
FACTS ALLEGED IN AFFIDAVIT IN OPPOSITION 
TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT NEED NOT 
NECESSARILY BE COMPOSED OF STRICTLY EVIDENTI-
ARY FA·CTS. 
The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Mcintosh, 112 
Cal. App. (2d) 177, 245 P. (2d) 1065 (1952); 
Sanford Co. v. Cory Glass etc. Co., 85 Cal. App. 
(2d) 724, 194 P. (2d) 127 (1948); 
Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. (2d) 
553, 122 P. (2d) 264 (1942); 
Strauss v. Strauss, 90 Cal. App. (2d) 757, 203 P. 
(2d) 857 (1949); 
Wyatt v. Madden, 32 Fed. (2d) 838, 59 App. D.C. 
38 (1929). 
In the Eagle case, supra, the plaintiff clai1ned that 
the defendant's affidavit contained nothing but conclu-
sions of fact and law and was thus insufficient. In an-
swering this contention, the Court, at page 561, held: 
"As we have seen, it is not necessary that the 
averments be rigidly restricted to evidentiary 
matter. It may be that some of the allegations or 
statements are somewhat in the nature of con-
clusions, but we are satisfied that facts within the 
knowledge of the affiants and to which they are 
competent to testify are set forth with sufficient 
particularity, and from which it appears that a 
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bona fide defense to the action exists. This is 
especially true, when we are mindful of the rule 
of liberal construction applicable to cover cases of 
this character." 
In the Strauss case, supra, the court stated, at page 
769: 
" ... and the affidavit to be sufficient need 
not necessarily be composed wholly of evidentiary 
facts." 
POINT VII. 
THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE PARTY MOVING FOR SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED. 
Banford Co. v. Cory Glass etc. Co., 85 Cal. App. 
(2d) 724, 194 P. (2d) 127 (1948); 
Wyatt v. Madden, 32 Fed. (2d) 838, 59 App. D.C. 
38 (1929). 
In the Sanford case, supra, at page 731, the Court 
said: 
". . . the affidavit of the moving party 
should be strictly construed.'' 
POINT VIII. 
THE AFFIDAVITS IN OPPOSITION TO THE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE LIBERALLY 
CONSTRUED. 
Sanford Co. v. Cory Glass etc. Co., 85 Cal. App. 
(2d) 724, 194 P. (2d) 127 (1948); 
Eagle Oil & Refining Co. v. Prentice, 19 Cal. (2d) 
553, 122 P. (2d) 264 (1952); 
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Wyatt v. llladden.J 32 Fed. (2d) 838, 59 App. D.C. 
38 (1929). 
In the Sanford case, supra, at page 731, the court 
stated: 
" ... and those (affidavits) of his opponent 
(the one opposing the motion for summary judg-
ment) (should be) liberally construed ... " 
In the Eagle case, supra, the court said, at page 561: 
". . . we are mindful of the rule of liberal 
construction applicable to cases of this character." 
In the Wyatt v. Madden case, supra, the plaintiff 
brought an action upon notes for default in payments 
thereon. The notes were secured by a deed of trust. De-
fendant in her affidavit alleged that she was induced to 
execute these notes through material misrepresentations, 
known to be false and made for the purpose of inducing 
her to sign these notes. The court below gTanted the 
motion. In reversing the case, the upper court held: 1. 
that a summary judgment deprived defendant of a trial 
on the merits; 2. that the plaintiff's (party making the 
motion) affidavit had to be strictly construed; 3. that 
tlle defendant's affidavit had to be liberally construed; 
4. and that if its terms reasonably warrant the infer-
ence that defendant has a substantial defense, summary 
judgment ought not to be entered. 
POINT IX. 
NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF A CONSPIRACY. 
"A civil conspiracy is a combination of two 
or more persons by concerted action to accom-
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plish an unlawful purpose, or to accomplish SOllie' 
purpose not in itself unlawful by unlawful mean. 
'Collusion' is the equivalent of conspiracy, being 
an agreement between two or nwre persons to de-
fraud another of his rights ... " 15 C.J.S. Con-
spiracy, Sec,tion 1, page 996-997. 
"No formal agreen1ent between the parties to 
do the act charged is necessary; it is sufficient 
that the minds of the parties meet understandingly 
so as to bring about an intelligent and deliberate 
agreement to do the acts and to c01nmit the offense 
charged although such agreement is not mani-
fested by any formal words, or by a written instru-
ment. If two persons pursue by their acts the 
same object often by the same means, one per-
forming one part of the act and the other another 
part of the act, so as to complete it with a view 
to attaining of the object which they are pursuing, 
this will be sufficient to constitute a conspiracy. 
It is not essential that each conspirator have 
knowledge of the details of the conspiracy or of 
the exact part to be performed by the other con-
spirators in execution thereof; nor is it necessary 
that the details be completely worked out in ad-
vance to bring a given act within the scope of the 
general plan." 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy, Section :2, 
page 998. 
''One who has conspired with others to cheat 
and defraud will in a proper case be held liable 
therefor. It is essential to a conspiracy to de-
fraud that there be some designed and positively 
fraudulent artifice employed, or that a fraudulent 
intent should exist on the part of the party sought 
to be held and that such fraud or artifice should 
be practiced on the party defrauded to his dam-
age." 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy, Section 9, page 1004. 
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"It has, however, been held that no affirma-
tive fraudulent representations need be shown, a 
conceahnent of the true nature of the transaction 
being sufficient." 15 C.J.S., Section 9, page 1005. 
POINT X. 
THE GRAVAMEN OF THE ACTION FOR DAMAGES 
FOR CONSPIRACY TO DEFRAUD IS THE CIVIL WRONG 
WHICH RESULTS IN DAMAGE. 
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. (:2d) 50, 172 
P. (2d) 533 (1946). 
In the cited case, the court held at page 72: 
"It is not the conspiracy but the civil wrong 
which gives rise to the cause of action. If plain-
tiff is successful in proving an injury of the na-
ture claimed, she may recover in her action against 
all those who have united or cooperated in inflict-
ing that injury (Recert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 193 
P. 943)." 
POINT XI. 
WHERE, AS IN THE CASE OF ATTORNEY-CLIENT, 
A RELATIONSHIP OF TRUST AND ·CONFIDENCE EXISTS, 
THERE IS A DUTY ON THE PART OF THE ATTORNEY 
TO DISCLOSE ALL MATERIAL FACTS AND FAILURE TO 
DO SO CONSTITUTES FRAUD. 
A confidential relationship exists between attorney 
and client. 
Gidney v. Chappelle, 26 Okla. 737, 110 P. 1099. 
rrhis confidential, or fiduciary, relationship binds 
the attorney to a duty of utmost fidelity. 
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Matter of Danford, 157 Cal. 425, 108 P. 322 
(1910); 
Cox v. Delmas, 99 Cal. 104, 33 P. 836 (1893). 
Where such a relationship of trust and confidence 
exists, there is a duty on the part of the attorney to dis-
close all the material facts and failure to do so consti-
tutes fraud. 
37 C.J.S., Sec.16 (d), p. 247; 
Daily v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App. (2d) 127, 
40 P. (2d) 935 (1935). 
In Matter of Danford, supra, the court states as fol-
lows, at page 429: 
"The relation between attorney and client is 
'a fiduciary relation of the very highest character 
and binds the attorney to most conscientious 
fidelity - uberri.ma fides.' ... It is one which 
precludes the attorney from obtaining any per-
sonal advantage by abusing the confidence re-
posed in him by his client." 
In Cox v. Delma.s, supra, the court, at page 124, 
holds that: 
"the attorney must show affirmatively that 
he gave full and proper advice in the premises, 
acted with entire fairness throughout the trans-
action, and took no advantage of his client.'' 
In Daily r. S~~tperior Court, supra, at pages 131-132, 
the court declares : 
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"Where there exists a relation of trust and 
confidence, it is the duty of the one in whom the 
confidence is reposed to make full disclosure of all 
material facts within his knowledge relating to 
the transaction in question, and any concealment 
of material facts is a fraud." 
POINT XII. 
A PERSON WHO NEGOTIATES A PURCHASE OF LAND 
FOR THE BENEFIT OF HIMSELF AND OTHERS, BEING 
THE AGENT OF HIS ASSOCIATES, IS BOUND AS SUCH 
TO THE UTMOST GOOD FAITH WITH THEM, REGARD-
LESS OF WHETHER THE DEALINGS CONSTITUTED A 
TENANCY IN COMMON OR A PARTNERSHIP. 
Sha.w v. Shaw, 160 Cal. 733, 117 P. 148 (1911). 
POINT XIII. 
CONCEALMENT OF A MATERIAL FACT CONVEYING 
A FALSE IMPRESSION ON THE MIND OF THE OTHER 
PARTY WILL SUPPORT AN ACTION IN FRAUD. 
The gist of an action for fraud is fraudulently pro-
ducing a false impression on the mind of the party, and 
if such result is accomplished, it is unimportant whether 
the means of accomplishing it are words or acts of the 
defendants or concealment and suppression of material 
facts not equally within the knowledge or the reach of 
the plaintiff. 
Sime v. Malouf, 95 Cal. App. (2d) 82, 212 P. (2d) 
946 (1949). 
The word ''conceal" pertains to affirmative action 
likely to prevent or intended to prevent knowledge of a 
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fact and refers to some advantage to some interested 
party or some disadvantage to some interested party 
from whom the fact is withheld. 
Mitchell v. Locurto, 79 Cal. App. (2d) 507, 179 P. 
(2d) 848 (1947). 
POINT XIV. 
AN ACTION WILL LIE AGAINST PARTIES WHO CON-
SPIRE WITH AN AGENT TO DEFRAUD THE LATTER'S 
PRINCIPAL, EVEN THOUGH THEY THEMSELVES ARE 
NOT FIDUCIARIES. 
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 500, 172 
P. (2d) 533 (1946) ; 
15 C.J.S., Conspiracy, section 9, p. 1005; 
Woefersberger v. Miller, 39 S.W. (2d) 758, 327 
Mo. 1150. 
POINT XV. 
CONSPIRATORS ARE JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY 
LIABLE FOR ALL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE CON-
SPIRACY, EACH BEING RESPONSIBLE FOR THE A.CTS 
OF THE OTHER IN FURTHERING THE COMMON DESIGN. 
Frost v. Hanscome, 198 Cal. 550, 246 P. 53 (1926); 
McPhetridge v. Smith, 101 Cal. App. 122, 281 P. 
419 (1929); 
Ellis v. Navarro, 61 Cal. App. (2d) 755, 143 P. 
(2d) 735 (1943); 
Peebler v. Olds, 71 Cal. App. (2d) 382, 162 P. 
(2d) 953 (1945) ; 
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Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 50, 172 
P. (2d) 533 (1946); 
Biggs v. Tourtas, 92 Cal. App. (2d) 316, 206 P. 
(2d) 871 (1949). 
In the Anderson case, plaintiff owned an apartment 
house which she valued at $55,000.00 and which she de-
sired to exchange for other property. She made known 
her desires to defendant Brown, a broker, who in turn 
contacted defendant Thacher in Los Angeles. Eventually 
plaintiff carne to Los Angeles to see various properties 
and met defendant Thacher. He found a building which 
the owners were willing to sell for $120,000.00 cash. The 
defendant Tliacher then told the plaintiff that he could 
get this building for her for $125,000.00 cash plus her 
property in San Diego. After making numerous repre-
sentations to the plaintiff, he succeeded in getting plain-
tiff to agree to buy this Los Angeles property under those 
terms. The check for $125,000.00 was made to one Mar-
garet .Tohnstone, a mother-in-law of another defendant 
broker, one Sackett, who worked with Thacher on this 
deal, and the conveyance of the San Diego property was 
made to the said defendant, Margaret Johnstone. Thacher 
had told the plaintiff that said defendant :Margaret 
Johnstone was a sister and co-owner of the Hollywood 
property and that she represented the co-owners of the 
Hollywood property for the purpose of this sale, all of 
which statements he knew to be lies. The fact was that 
defendant Margaret Johnstone was merely being used 
as a durnrny in the two escrows. Actually, the owners of 
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the Hollywood property sold it for $124,000.00 cash paid 
to them by Margaret Johnstone who had received the 
check for $125,000.00 plus the conveyance of the San 
Diego property from the plaintiff. This all happened 
around September, 1937. Not until September, 1940, did 
the plaintiff discover the true situation, to wit, that 
her Hollywood property had been sold for $124,000.00 
and that she had given up the property in San Diego as a 
secret profit. All of the defendants were sued on the 
theory of recovering a secret profit obtained by one who 
owed a fiduciary duty to the principal, plaintiff herein. 
A judgment for $40,000.00, the value of the San Diego 
property, was recovered against all the defendants, not 
only the broker who had a fiduciary duty to his principal, 
but also against Margaret Johnstone, the mother-in-law 
who acted as the dummy in the escrows, and the defend-
ant broker Sackett, her son-in-law. Each of the defend-
ants appealed separately. 
72: 
The court in ruling on the above point held at page 
''And where, after the violation of a fiduciary 
obligation, an amount is found to be due from 
the agent, judgment for the same amount may 
also be rendered against those proven to have 
fraudulently aided in the attempt of the fiduciary 
to obtain secret profits, although they themselves 
are not fiduciaries, and even though they receive 
no share of the profits (Lomita Land & Water Co. 
v. Robinson, 154 Cal. 36 [97 P. 10, 18 L.R.A.N.S. 
1106] ) ." 
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At page 72, the court further held: 
"Because of the inherent difficulty in proving 
a conspiracy, it has been held that a conspiracy 
may sometimes be inferred from the nature of the 
acts done, the relations of the parties, the interests 
of the alleged conspirators, and other circum-
stances (Revert v. Hesse, supra). That both de-
fendants Thacher and Sackett knew that plain-
tiff's San Diego property was not to be included 
as a consideration for the Hollywood Boulevard 
propert:" is attested by the fact that both defend-
ants agreed that Thacher was to wait for his $5,-
000.00 commission until plaintiff's property was 
acquired by defendant Johnstone and a loan could 
be negotiated thereon. The question might also be 
appropriately asked as to why defendant Sackett 
selected defendant Johnstone, his mother-in-law, 
to act as a 'dummy' in the escrow opened in con-
nection with the Chase property~ Was it to keep 
secret the fact that plaintiff was not, as defend-
ant Thacher represented to her, transferring title 
to her San Diego property in exchange for the 
Hollywood Boulevard property~ Why was a 
double escrow resorted to 1rhen if there u·as noth-
ing to conceal front plaintiff a single escrow would 
have sufficed?" 
We believe that the facts in our case closely parallel 
the facts in this case as far as perpetrating fraud on the 
plaintiffs is concerned. W P may take that which is under-
lined above and paraphrase it to read as follows: Why 
were two bills of sale and two deeds resorted to when, if 
there was nothing to conceal from plaintiffs, a single bill 
of sRle and deed would have sufficed? The answer is that 
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had there been a single deed and a single bill of sale the 
plaintiffs would have been informed by that single bill 
of sale that ~Ioreton was to have received $287,500.00 
and each of the co-owners was to receive only $33,333.00. 
The two bills of sale and the two deeds just like the two 
escrows in the Anderson case were used so as to fradu-
lently conceal fron1 the plaintiffs the secret profit which 
in the Anderson was only $40,000.00 and in our case 
was over $254,000.00, a sum to shock the conscience of the 
most hardened. 
4 Restatement of Law of Torts, §876. 
"F·or harm resulting to a third person from 
tortious conduct of another, a person is liable if 
he: 
(a) Orders or induces ~such conduct, know-
ing the condition::s under which the act is done 
or intending the consequences which ensue, or 
(b) knows that the other's conduct consti-
tutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assist-
ance or encouragement to the other so to con-
duct himself, or 
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other 
in accmnplishing a tortious result and his own 
conduct separately considered constitutes a breach 
of duty to the third person." 
Applying this section of the restatement to our facts, 
1\tiathesius knew of the other's (Moreton's) conduct, knew, 
or as a reasonable nTan should have known, that :More-
ton's conduct was a breach of duty towards the plaintiffs, 
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and yet gave substantial assistance and encouragement 
to :Moreton so as to conduct himself (by having the trans-
action for the sale of the l\I & H claims divided into two 
transactions for one purpose only) to continue the de-
ceit that had been perpetrated upon the plaintiffs. 
This is the comment on clause (b) in the Restate-
ment: 
Advice or encouragmnent to ad operates as 
a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act en-
couraged is known to be tortious, it has the same 
effect upon the liability of the advisor as partici-
pation or physical assistance. 
If the encouragement or assistance is a sub-
stantial factor in causing the resulting tort, the 
one giving it is himself a tortfeasor and is re-
sponsible for the consequences of the other's act. 
POINT XVI. 
A CO-CONSPIRATOR IS LIABLE FOR ALL OVERT ACTS 
·COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OF THE CONSPIRACY, 
WHETHER HE JOINED WILLINGLY OR UNWILLINGLY 
OR WHETHER HE WAS AN ACTIVE P ARTI.CIP ANT OR 
NOT. 
This is true even though the results were not speci-
fically intended or the means specifically agreed upon, 
and it is true whether the alleged tort amounts to a crime 
or not. 
Langston v. Craddock, 156 S.E. 632, 42 Ga. App. 
484 (1931); 
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Hill -c. Reynolds, 91 S.E. 434, 19 Ga. App. 334 
(1917); 
Burgess Bros. Co. v. Stewart, 184 N. Y. S. 199, 112 
Misc. Rep. 347 (aff.) (1920); 
Wells v. Lloyd, 6 Cal. (2d) 70, 56 P. (2d) 517 
(1936); 
Mox, Inc. v. Woods, 202 Cal. 675, 262 P. 302 
(1927); 
Revert v. Hesse, 184 Cal. 295, 193 P. 943 (1920); 
M cPhetridge v. Smith, 101 Cal. App. 122, 281 P. 
419 (1929); 
Neblett v. Elliott, 46 Cal. App. (2d) 294, 115 P. 
(2d) 872 (1941); 
Turnarn v. Brown, 59 Cal. App. (2d) 16, 138 P. (2d) 
363 (1943); 
State v. Day, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 536, 173 P. (2d) 
399 (1946); 
Biggs v. Tourtas, 92 Cal. App. (2d) 316, 206 P. 
(2d) 871 (1949); 
Globe Dairy Lunch Co. v. Joint Executive Bd. of 
Culinary Workers, 117 Cal. App. (2d) 190, 
255 P. (2d) 94 (1953). 
POINT XVII. 
PERSONS COMING IN AFTER FORMATION OF CON-
SPIRACY ARE LIABLE FOR ALL ACTS PREVIOUSLY OR 
SUBSEQUENTLY DONE IN PURSUANCE THEREOF. 
Franck r. Moran, 36 Cal. App. 32, 171 P. 841; 
Calcutt -u. Gerig, C.C.A., Tenn., 271 F. 220 (1921); 
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Rosco Trading Co. v. Goldenberg, 182 N.Y. S. 711 
(1920); 
Eyak River Packing Co. v. Huglen, 143 Wash. 299, 
255 p. 123, ( aff.) ( 1927) ; 
Marcus v. Hess, U.S. ex rel., D.C. Pa., 41 F. Supp. 
197 (rev d. on oth. grds.) ( 1941) ; 
Lesnik 17. Public Industrials Corporation, C. C.A. 
N.Y., 144 F. (2d) 968 (1944); 
Sears v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Stablemen and Helpers of Amer-
ica, Local No. 524, 8 Wash. (2d) 883, 112 
P. (2d) 850, (1946). 
Under the authority of the above cited cases the 
corporate defendants would be liable for all of the acts 
of the 1\Ioretons even though they, the corporate defend-
ants, did not instigate the conspiracy but came into it 
at the time they received Rex's letter. 
POINT XVIII. 
A CONSPIRATOR IS LIABLE EVEN THOUGH HE EX-
PECTED TO RECEIVE NO BENEFIT AND IN FACT RE-
CEIVED NO BENEFIT. 
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 50, 172 
P. (2d) 533 (1946). 
In discussing the necessity as to whether any par-
ticular eonspirator must have profited in order to be 
liable, the court, at page 74, said: 
"In the state of the evidence here presented 
we would not be justified in disturbing the conclu-
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sion arrived at by the trier of facts that defendant 
Johnstone joined in the plan and scheme initiated 
by defendants Thacher and Sackett to obtain 
plaintiff's San Diego property as a secret profit; 
that her conduct in acting as a 'dummy' in the 
dual escrows and in the subsequent negotiations 
through which plaintiff's property was disposed 
of, were illegal and in furtherance of the common 
scheme or design to achieve the unlawful pur-
pose of the conspiracy. As heretofore pointed out, 
the liability of a conspirator is not dependent on 
whether such conspirator receives any of the bene-
fits of the conspiracy. By reason of the surrepti-
tious and deceptive means resorted to by her co--
defendants and in which defendant Johnstone will-
ingly used her name, it cannot be said that the 
trial court's inference that she had knowledge of 
the conspiracy and its unlawful purpose was un-
reas1onable .... '' 
POINT XIX. 
EVIDEN·CE OF OTHER SIMILAR FRAUDS MAY BE 
SHOWN TO PROVE A CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT A PAR-
TICULAR FRAUD. 
T·o prove a conspiracy to commit a particular fraud, 
it may be shown that the same conspirator perpetrated 
similar frauds on third persons about the same time or 
in execution of the same plan. 
Davis v. M aislen, 116 Conn. 375, 165 A. 451, 
(1933); 
M ontgom.ery v. Crum, 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251, 
(1928); 
Mason v. Gantz, Tex. Civ. App. 226 S.W. 435 
(1920); 
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Davis v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 68 N.E. (2d) 
571, Affd. 68 N.E. (2d) 231 (1938). 
POINT XX. 
ONE CONSPIRATOR, ALTHOUGH UNCORROBORATED, 
IS A COMPETENT WITNESS AGAINST A CO-CONSPIRA-
TOR. 
Bean v. Bean, 12 Mass. 20 (1815); 
New York Guaranty, Etc., Co. v. Gleason, 78 N.Y. 
503, 7 Abb. N. Cas. 334 (1879) ; 
Moore v. Tracy, 7 Wend. 229 N.Y. (1860); 
Reichert v. Sh~tscavage, 72 Pa. Dist. & Co. 279, 
41 Luz. Leg. Reg. 251 (1950). 
The law permits great latitude in the admission of 
circumstantial evidence tending to establish a conspiracy 
and those advising and encouraging, aiding, abetting and 
ratifying the overt acts committed for the purpose of 
carrying into effect the objects of the conspiracy. 
United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado 
Coal Co., Ark., 169 C.C.A. 549, 258 F. 829, 
(reversed) (1919); 
Good v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., D.C. 
S.C., 39 F. Supp. 475,480 (1941). 
POINT XXI. 
WHERE A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION EXISTS, NOTH-
ING SHORT OF ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE WILL PREVENT 
RE.COVERY FOR MISREPRESENTATION. 
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If a confidential relation exists between the parties, 
nothing sliort of actual knowledge will prevent recovery 
for misrepresentation by the one in whom the confidence 
is reposed. 
37 C.J.S. sec. 27 (b) p. 269; 
Butcher v. Newburger, 318 Pa. 547, 179 .A. 249. 
In Bu.tcher v. N ewburger, supra, at page 241, the 
~ourt states : 
"Where, as here, the parties dealt on a basis 
of trust and confidence, the rule is to hold the 
party making a representation bound by it ... 
If fiduciary relations obtain, nothing short of 
actual knowledge will prevent rec1overy for mis-
representations." 
POINT XXII. 
THE MERE FACT THAT SUSPICIONS ARE AROUSED 
BY STATEMENTS OF THIRD PERSONS DOES NOT PRE-
CLUDE RECOVERY FOR A MISREPRESENTATION AC-
TUALLY RELIED UPON. 
The mere fact that one's suspicions are aroused by 
statements of third persons does not necessarily preclude 
recovery for a misrepresentation actually relied on. 
37 C.J.S., sec. 31 pp. 275-6; 
Williams v. Bedenba.ugh, 215 .Ala. 200, 110 So. 286, 
(1935); 
Perkins v. Orfield, 145 Minn. 68, 176 N.W. 157 
(1920); 
Emery v. Third Nat'l. Bank, 308 Pa. 504, 162 .A. 
281 (1932); 
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Benjamin v. Starkweather, 32 ~Iich. 305 (1875). 
In Williams v. Bedenbaugh, supra, where an attorney 
told a representative of the plaintiff that plaintiff was 
making a bad investment, the court, at p. 289, stated: 
''If she (plaintiff), nevertheless, chose to 
trust and did trust the defendants as her friends 
and as having better knowledge of the c'ondition 
of their company, it is not for them to say: 'You 
should not have believed our report.' '' 
In Perkims v. Orfield, supra, it was held as follows, 
'at page 157: 
"While .:\Irs. Perkins (plaintiff) testified 
when she C1ould get no verbal statement from Linn 
(one of the defendants) at the time she was press-
ing for information, other than the statement 
made when he handed her the Hurd letter, she 
was suspicious that something ·was wrong, she did 
not know what, that is far from sufficient to take 
from her the right to rely upon the representa-
tions, which clearly were made to induce her to 
enter into the trade." 
In Emery v. Third Na.t'l. Bank, supra, at page 284, 
the court states : 
" a bare suspicion or an opportunity 
to learn the truth through the exercise of reason-
able diligence does not constitute knowledge of 
fraud sufficient to prevent recovery." 
In Benjamin v. Starkweather, supra, at page 307, 
the court holds : 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
78 
"It would be absurd to allow S1treet talk about 
the size of a farm to rebut the conclusions of fraud 
arising out of positive untruths. It is certainly not 
presumable that others will know better than 
the parties interested; and even if ~such rumors 
had been multiplied and brought home to Benja-
min (plaintiff), he would be justified in believing 
Starkweather's (defendant) statements based on 
better knowledge.'· 
POINT XXIII. 
THE RULE REQUIRING INVESTIGATION CANNOT BE 
INVOKED BY A THIRD PERSON IN COLLUSION WITH 
ONE HAVING A CONFIDENTIAL RELATION WITH THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
Where a third person is in collusion with ·one having 
a confidential relationship with the plaintiff, the rule 
requiring investigation cannot be invoked by said third 
person. 
Wustrack v. Hall, 95 Neb. 384, 145 N.W. 835 
(1914); 
Shoup v. Dawson) 134 N.J. Eq. 440, 36 A. (2d) 65 
.(19·44); 
Zimmer v. Gudmumdson, 142 Neb. 260,5 N.W. (2d) 
707 (1942). 
POINT XXIV. 
EVEN THOUGH MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE OR IN-
VESTIGATION ARE OPEN TO ONE, NO DUTY RESTS UPON 
ONE TO SO EMPLOY SUCH MEANS OR KNOWLEDGE 
WHERE HE IS JUSTIFIED IN RELYING UPON THE 
REPRESENTATIONS MADE TO HIM. 
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\\nere a person is justified in relying, and does in 
fact rely, upon false representations, his right of action 
is not destroyed because means of knowledge are open 
to him and no duty is devolved upon him in such case to 
employ such means of knowledge. 
Blackman v. Howes, 82 Cal. App. (2d) 275, 185 P. 
(2d) 1019 (1947). 
In our case, 11:oreton told Rex Holland that the steel 
companies would pay ten cents a ton f 1or the ore. This 
was an affirnmtive misrepresentation, as in truth and 
in fact .Moreton knew that the steel companies were pay-
ing twenty-five cents a ton. Therefore, under the author-
ities cited there was no duty on the part of the plain-
tiff to attempt to ascertain the true price, although in 
fact the plaintiff did attempt to ascertain the true facts 
by the only means he knew of, by writing a letter dated 
September 1-t-, 1948 to Columbia, which letter was never 
answered. Had Columbia answered Rex's letter advising 
him of the simple fact that they were paying twenty-five 
cents a ton for the ore, the co-owners would of course 
not have gone through with the deal. 
POINT XXV. 
A PERSON MAY RELY UPON ONE WHO ACTUALLY 
DEFRAUDED HIM WHERE HIS CONDUCT IN LIGHT OF 
HIS OWN INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION WAS NOT 
UNREASONABLE AND MAY RECOVER FOR THE FRAUD. 
A plaintiff seeking relief from fraud will not be de-
nied relief because he reposed. too much confidence in the 
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person who actually defrauded hhn where it cannot be 
said that his conduct in light of his own knowledge and 
information was manifestly unreasonable. 
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 50, 172 
P. (2d) 533 (1946). 
POINT XXVI. 
A PERSON TO WHOM A FALSE REPRESENTATION 
IS MADE IS NOT HELD TO CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE OF A 
PUBLIC RECORD WHICH WOULD REVEAL THE TRUE 
FACTS. 
The purpose of the recording acts is to afford pro-
tection not to those who make fradulent representations 
but to bona fide purchasers for value, and the person 
to whom a false representation is made is not held to con-
structive notice of a public record which would reveal 
the true facts. 
Seeger v. Odell, 18 Cal. (2d) 409, 115 P. (2d) 977, 
136 A.L.R .. 1291 ( 1941) ; 
Rogers v. Warden, 20 Cal. (2d) 286, 125 P. (2d) 
7 (1942); 
Hefferan 'L Freebairn, 34 Cal. (2d) 715, 214 P. 
(2d) 386 (1950)~ 
Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. (2d) 50, 172 
P. (2d) 533 (1946); 
Stoll v. Selander, 81 Cal. App. (2d) 286, 183 P . 
. (2d) 935 (1947). 
In the Seeger case above, on the question of duty to 
consult records, the court held : 
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" . and it is well established that he is not 
held to constructive notice of a public record which 
would reveal the true facts. (Rest. T:orts, sec. (b); 
see cases cited in 12 Cal. J ur. 759; Prosser, Torts, 
750, 751.) The purpose of the recording acts is to 
afford protection not to those who make fraudu-
lent misrepresentations but to bona fide pur-
chasers for value." 
The court had this further to say in the Seeger case: 
"No rogue should enjoy his ill-gotten plunder 
for the simple reason that his victim is by chance 
a fool ... " 
The antiquated authority that one must assume 
that everyone with whom he has ra business transaction 
is a rogue and act accordingly will not receive judicial 
approvaL 
POINT XXVII. 
ESTOPPELS ARE NOT FAVORED BY THE LAW. 
Weinberg v. Vaughn Corp., 137 Cal. App. 55, 29 
Pac. (2d) 862 (1944). 
POINT XXVIII. 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED UPON 
ESTOPPEL SHOULD BE DENIED WHEN THE VERY QUES-
TION OF ESTOPPEL PRESENTS A FACTUAL ISSUE. 
Begnard v. White, 170 F. (2d) 323, 12 F. R. Serv. 
56 (c) 57, Case 1 (1948). 
Estoppel, like any other issue, may be smnmarily 
adjudicated when it doe-; not involve any genuine issue 
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of material fact, but when the question of estoppel in-
volves a factual issue, then a summary judgment should 
be refused. 
POINT XXIX. 
A PARTY IS NOT ESTOPPED BY A WRITTEN INSTRU-
MENT WHI·CH HE IS INDUCED BY THE FRAUD OF THE 
OTHER PARTY TO EXECUTE. 
"A party is not estopped by a contr•act or in-
strument which he is induced by the fraud of the 
other party to execute." 31 C.J.S., Estoppel, sec. 
75, p. 281-282. 
Corcoran v. Waugh, 368 Ill. 318, 13 N.E. (2d) 961 
(1938); 
Capit,al Amusement Co. v. Bd. of Common Co1JJYI;cil 
of City of Frankfort, 210 Ky. 622, 276 S.W. 
528, ( 1925) ; 
See also, 
Rochelle v. Anderson, 113 Okla. 137, 243 Pac. 528 
(1925); 
Sawtelle v. Astor, 23 Tenn. App. 33, 126 S.W. (2d) 
367 (1938); 
Roberts v. Roberts, 81 Cal. App. (2d) 871, 185 
Pac. (2d) 381 (1947). 
POINT XXX. 
THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE IN-
VOKED BY J\NY PARTY GUILTY OF FRAUD. 
Joh!n Hancock Etc., Ins. Co. v. Markowitz, 62 
Cal. App. (2d) 388, 144 Pac. (2d) 899 (1944); 
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Pacific Finarnce Corp. v. Hendley, 119 Cal. App. 
697, 7 P. (2d) 391 (1932). 
In the J ohm Hancock case, supra, the court stated as 
follows, at page 408: 
" ... the company was led into the position 
of making payments to its prejudice· by the fraudu-
lent action of the defendant ... The equitable 
doctrine of estoppel can never operate to protect 
one from the consequences of his fraud.'' 
POINT XXXI. 
ESTOPPEL CANNOT BE RELIED UPON SO AS TO 
CREATE LIABILITY WHERE AGENT ACTING SOLELY FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF HIS PRINCIPAL ACTIVELY PARTICI-
PATED IN THE DECEIT AND FRAUD AND SOLICITED 
THE A.CT FROM THE PERSON SOUGHT TO BE ESTOPPED 
BY THE PRINCIPAL. 
First National Bank v. Reed, 198 Cal. 252, 244 
P. 368 (1926). 
POINT XXXII. 
ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE USED AS A SHIELD 
AGAINST THE RESULTS OF FRAUD, WRONGFUL OR ANY 
INEQUITABLE CONDUCT IN THE TRANSACTIONS. 
New York Life Ins. Co. v. Odom, C.C.A. Ga., 93 F. 
(2d) 641 (certiorari denied, 304 U.S. 566, 58 
S. Ct. 948, 82 L. Ed. 1532 and 304 U.S. 566, 58 
S. Ct. 949, 82 L. Ed. 1532 (1938); 
Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 New York 424, 38 N.E. 
458 (1894); 
Cawthon v. Cochell, Tex. Civ. App. 121 S.W. (2d) 
414 (1938); 
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Cohe.n v. Lew~s, Tex. Civ. App. 44 S.W. (2d) 468 
(1931); 
Sueskind v. llliclwel Hardware Co., 228 Ky. 780, 
15 s.w. (2d) 528 (1929); 
New Jersey National Bank & Trust Co. v. Berk-
shire, Inc. 9 N.J. l\1:isc. 933, 156 A. 40 (1931); 
John Hancock Mutu.al Life Ins. Co. v.-Markowitz, 
62 Cal. App. (2d) 388, 144 P. (2d) 899 (1944). 
POINT XXXIII. 
ESTOPPEL MAY NOT BE RELIED UPON AS A DE-
FENSE AGAINST A FRAUDULENT PLAN OR AN AT-
TEMPT TO DEFRAUD IN WHICH PARTY CLAIMING ES-
TOPPEL WAS ACTIVE PARTICIPANT. 
Rushville National Bank of Rushville v. Sta.te Life 
Ins. Co., 210 Ind. 492, 1 N.E. (2d) 445 (1936); 
Stephan v. Top~c, 147 Minn. 263, 180 N.W. 221 
(1920). 
POINT XXXIV. 
DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL BASED ON CONDUCT OR 
REPRESENTATIONS INDUCED BY FRAUDULENT .CON-
CEALMENT OF PARTY CLAIMING IT MAY NOT BE IN-
VOKED. 
Milwaukee- American Ass'n v. La.ndis, D.C., Ill., 
49 F'. (2d) 298 (1931); 
Capital Amu.sement Co. r. Board of Common 
Council of City of Frankfort, 210 Ky. 622, 276 
s.w. 528, 531 (1925); 
Kellogg- Mackay Co. v. O'Neal, 39 Ohio App. 372, 
177 N.E. 778 (1931); 
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Parmenter v. Mueller, 17 Ohio Cir. Ct. N.S. 104 
(1910); 
Reclamation Co. v. Western Brokerage & Supply 
Co., Tex. Civ. App. 57 S.W. (2d) 274, affirmed 
Western Brokerage & Supply Co. v. Reclam-
ation Co., 127 Tex. 386, 93 S.W. (2d) 393 
(1936); 
Carter v. Hall, 191 Ky. 75, 229 S.W. 132 (1921); 
Formam v. Gramt Lunch Corporation, 113 N.J. Eq. 
175, 166 A. 219 (1~33) ; 
Otte v. Pierce, 111 Colo. 386, 142 P. (2d) 280, 282 
(1943); 
Swaim v. Martin, 302 Ky. 381, 194 S.W. (2d) 855 
(1946); 
Scottsbluff Nat. Bank v. Blue J. Feeds, Inc., 156 
Neb. 65,54 N.W. (2d) 392 (1952). 
POINT XXXV. 
ESTOPPEL IS NOT APPLIED TO PENALIZE AN IN-
NOCENT PARTY WHO HAS BEEN MISLED TO HIS MA-
TERIAL PREJUDICE. 
The doctrine of estoppel will not be applied to penal-
ize an innocent party who has been misled to his mater-
'i1al prejudice by express representations of another. 
Blackstone Valley Gas & Electric Co. v. Rhode 
_Island Power Co., (R. 2.) 12 A. (2d) 739, 
(1940). 
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POINT XXXVI. 
FULL KNOWLEDGE OF THE REAL FACTS AT THE 
TIME OF THE CONCEALMENT, REPRESENTATION OR 
OTHER CONDUCT OF THE PARTY CLAIMING THE ES-
TOPPEL IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT OF ESTOP-
PEL. 
It is indispensable to the application of the doctrine 
of equitable estoppel that the person claimed to be 
estopped shall have had full knowledge of the real facts 
at the time of his representation, concealment or other 
conduct relating thereto and alleged to constitute the 
basis of the estoppel. 
Battle v. Niece, 43 Cal. App. (2d) 655, 111 P. 
(2d) 455 (1941); 
Mercer Casualty Co. v. Lewis, 41 Cal. App. 
(2d) 918, 108 P. (2d) 65 (1940); 
Hacker Pipe & Supply Co. v. Chapman Valve 
Mfg. Co., 17 Cal. App. (2d) 265; 61 P. (2d) 
944 (1936) ; 
Weinberg v. John A. F augh:n Corporation, 137 
Cal. App. 55, 29 P. (2d) 862 (1934); 
Weintraub 1:. Weingart, 98 Cal. App. 690, 277 
P. 752 (1929); 
Rice v. McCarthy, 73 Cal. App. 655, 239 P. 56 
(1925); 
Bisconer v. Billing, 71 Cal. App. 779, 236 P. 329 
329 (1925); 
Norton v. Overholtzer, 63 Cal. App. 388, 218 P. 
639 (1923); 
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Marlenee v. Brown, App. 128 P. (2d) 137, subs. 
op. 21 CaL (2d) 668, 134 P. (2d) 770, (1943); 
Jiirich r. Underwriters At Lloyd's London, 64 
Cal. App. (2d) 522, 149 P. (2d) 19 (1944); 
People 1'. Ocean Shore R.R., 32 Cal. (2d) 406, 
196 P. (2d) 570, 6 ALR (2d) 1179 (former 
opinion 181 P. (2.1) 705) 
CONCLUSION 
From the fact that M:athesius instructed }[oreton to 
contact the co-owners with regard to patenting and sell-
ing their property, can it not be inferred that :Moreton 
had not yet arranged to act aR their attorney in patent-
ing the claims and in selling the property for them. 
Had M·oreton already contacted the co-owners and 
were he already representing them, surely he would 
have so advised l\1athesius and it, therefore, would not 
have been necessary for l\Iathesius to have directed 
)fore ton so to do. 
It can, therefore, be reasonably inferred that Col-
umbia instigated the conspiracy and was in it from the 
very beginning to the present time. 
According to both l\lathesius and _Moreton the price 
per ton had not yet been agreed upon and the tonnage 
had not yet even been estimated when R.ex I-Iolland 
wrote his letter of September 14, 1948 to l\Iathesius. 
If Columbia was not In the conspiracy from the very 
beginning, it got into it after Mathesius received Rex's 
letter. 
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Rex's letter was sufficient even according to l\iathe-
sius' own interpretation of it to put him on notice that 
the co-owners had been 1nisinformed regarding the 
value of, and uniformed reg·arding the price that Col-
umbia was paying for the entire property. The letter 
likewise advised Mathesius that the agreement with 
Moreton was that he was to get only one-fourth of the 
total price paid. 
Mathesius assisted l\Ioreton and participated in the 
conspiracy when he refused to answer Rex's letter and 
when he destroyed the single contract of sale, departed 
from his usual and customary practice and substituted 
two separate offe-rs to sell and two separate contracts 
of sale and two separate deeds and two sepa.rate checks 
and when he instructed _Moreton to secure the two letters 
from the co-owners which contained fraudulent impli-
cations and which omitted the price per ton that Columbia 
was paying for the ore and for the entire property and 
perhaps even the correct tonnage. 
The pretended negotiations, consisting of between 
25 and 38 words, were indeed meager and their meager-
ness alone renders the entire transaction suspect. 
According to the testimony of both l\Iathesius and 
Moreton there were never any separate negotiations 
whatsoever with regard to the sale of either Moreton's 
one-fourth interest or the co-owners three-fourths inter-
est. The pretended negotiations covered merely the sale 
of the entire property. 
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No one even claims that any of the co-owners were 
told that Columbia had agreed to pay 25 cents per ton 
after Mathesius received Rex's letter and after the 
agreement to pay that amount had been reached and 
before the time of the closing of the deal on December 
20, 1948. 
Heald, Moreton and Mathesius concealed from the 
co-owners the total price Columbia was paying when the 
deal was closed and did not affix the revenue stamps to 
any deeds in the presence of the co-owners. This is 
testified to by Rex Holland and his mo'ther, Clara Holland 
and Mathesius himself in several places admits that he 
did not advise the co-owners thereof. 
The corporate defendants obviously knew that the 
co-owners did not know the price per ton or the total 
price that Columbia was paying for the entire property. 
This is clearly evidenced by the studied effort in those 
two letters to conceal those facts from the co-owners. 
If the defendants had not conspired to defraud the 
co-owners, would they not have simply included in either 
one of those two letters of October 16, 1948, and November 
20, 1948, the simple state:"llent that Columbia was paying 
25 cents per ton for the ore or that the total price was 
$387,500.00. 
Looking at the record with simple realism, does it 
not unequivocally and for a certainty appear that Col-
umbia and Moreton assisted each other in the perpe-
tration of the fraud; that J Jhn Holland always trusted 
J\foreton from the beginning of the transaction until his 
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death; that except for a very brief interval which was 
before Columbia had 'agreed upon the price per ton and 
before the tonnage had been estimated, Rex H·olland 
always trusted Moreton; that after that brief interval, 
Rex concluded not to rely on Canfield, whose infornla-
tion was indefinite and who had proved himself unre-
liable, but rather to rely on what his lawyer, Moreton, 
had told him regarding the tonnage and the value per 
ton; that R.ex's confidence in Moreton was completely 
restored and that at the time the deal was closed, all of 
the co-owners believed that Columbia was paying a 
.total price of approximately $133,000.00 for the property 
and that Columbia was payiiJg Moreton only one-fourth 
of the total amount paid; that had the co-owners known 
the true facts they never would have gone through with 
the deal. 
Finally, is it not true that in any event there surely 
EXIST triable issues and that, therefore, the plain-
tiffs are at the very least entitled to a trial of those 
issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WILLIAM JEROl\1:E POLLACK 
333 South Beverly Drive 
Beverly Hills, Califoruia 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE 
ROBERTS & BLACK 
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS 
530 Judge Building 
8alt Lake City, Utah 
Co1tnsel for Appellants 
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APPENDIX A 
Cedar City, Utah 
Sept. 14, 1948 
Dr. Walter Mathesius 
Geneva Steel Corporation 
Provo, Utah 
Dear Sir: 
I sincerely hope that you will give this letter a lot of 
consideration as it means so much to us as the original 
owners of the M & H Iron Mining property }oca ted at 
Desert Mount, Utah that has been placed in the hands of 
:.Jir. Arthur E. Moreton, Attorney at L'aw, Judge Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah, who has advised us that the United 
States Steel Co. has expressed to him their intentions to 
purchase this property and the reasons I am writing you 
to postpone the purchase of this property until a more 
satisfactory ,agreement can be reached between we, the 
original & present owners, and Mr. Moreton. 
Ever since the property has been diamond drilled 
:Mr. Moreton has made us believe that there was only 
One :Million, Four Hundred Thousand (1,400,000) tons 
of iron ore contained in this deposit. 
We agreed to accept $100,000.00 for this property 
based upon that tonnage and have signed Articles of 
Agreement that will expire at the end of September, 
1948. Since we signed the Agreement we have been 
advised that instead of One Million, F'our Hundred 
Thousand tons of iron upon the property there are three 
million five hundred thousand tons of iron ore and that 
it is being offered for sale for .25 cents per ton or a 
total sales price of $875,000.00 
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Therefore Mr. Moreton, has through misleading us 
about the total tonnage, had us sign an agreement that 
will net him $775,000.00 for a $700.00 investment. 
Will you consider postponing the purchase of the 
property until after N ovemher 1st, 1948 and notify l\lr. 
l\{oret,on that the sale has been canceled. This will then 
give time for the Agreement between us to expire. \V e 
will then demand that the sale be made on an equal 
basis whereby we the owners of the property will receive 
three fourths of the total and Mr. Moreton will receive 
his 1/4 interest for patenting the property. This will be 
a fair return of $218,750.00 for his $700.00 investment 
and we who have been doing yearly assessment work for 
many years, to keep the property with a clear title, will 
enter into the sale of our property on a 3/4 equal basis. 
Will you also please send me a duplicate copy of 
the letter advising Mr. Moreton of the refusal to pur-
chase the property until after No'V. 1st, 1948 so that he 
can not in a future agreement between us insert the 
clause that the sale under old agreement is "still pend-
ing". 
I write you this letter as a good citizen and a Vet-
eran of World War II, who has given three years of my 
life for the protection of this country and feel that you 
will not refuse my request to postpone a s'ale that will 
now be unjust to us. 
Hoping that an immediate answer will be made 
before it is too late, I remain 
Yours truly, 
jsj Rex Holland 
125 So. 3rd East St. 
Cedar City, Utah 
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APPENDIXB 
Cedar City, Utah 
Octoter 16, 1948 
Columbia Iron Mining Company 
Provo, Utah 
Attention Dr. vValther niathesius, President. 
Re: n1 & H, M & H No. 1 & ~1 & H #2 Lode Min-
ing Claims at Desert Mound 
Gentlemen: 
\Ve understand that proposed purchase of our inter-
est in the three ~I & H Claims at Desert Mound, Iron 
Oounty, Utah, known as M & H, M & H No.1 and M & H 
#2 Lode Mining Claims, is awaiting your determination 
of estimated tonnage (which we understand you estimate 
at 1.55 million tons) and issuance of patent to us by the 
United States Government. 
We, the undersigned, have this day prepared and 
submitted to you an ·offer for the sale of our interest in 
and to said ~1 & H Mining Claims for the sum of $100, 
000.00 cash. This purchase price to be paid us is entirely 
satisfactory to us, and in full for our interest. 
We realize that in order to interest a purchaser in 
these claims, it would be necessary that they be patented. 
However, we were without such funds or means to secure 
such patent and costs incident thereto and we therefore 
asked Mr. Arthur E. Moreton to secure such patent, at 
his sole cost and expense in return for an interest. 
Needless to say, Mr. Moreton may offer and sell his in-
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terest in said clai1ns f.or whatever price you and he may 
agree upon, if he so desires, and the entire proceeds there-
from will of course be his sole property, it being his right 
to determine and to receive whatever amount you may 
agree upon with him. 
Sincerely yours, 
jsj .John G. Holland 
jsj C. S. Holland 
jsj Rex Holland 
js/ William C. J\Iurie 
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APPE~J)IX C 
Cedar City, Utah 
November 20, 1948 
Oolumbia Iron :.Mining Company 
Provo, Utah 
Attention Dr. Walther Mathesius, President: 
Re: }1 & H, M&H No.1 & M & H #2 Lode Min-
ing Claims at Desert Mound 
Gentlemen: 
\Ve reaffirm our letter to you of October 16, 1948 
with respect to the offer made by us to your company ror 
the sale of our interest in and to the M & H Claims at 
Desert :.Mound for the sum of $100,000.00 cash. 
We 1nake this offer to sell our interest for this sum, 
free and clear of all encurnberances and lawful claims 
whatsoever. Patent on these claims has now been issued 
and we hope for an early acceptance of our offer. 
An interest in these claims is also held by Arthur 
E. ~Ioreton, and it is no concern of ours as to when and 
to whom he may sell his interest or at what price or upon 
what terms. 
Sincerly yours, 
jsj John G. Holland 
jsj C. S. Holland 
jsj Rex Holland 
jsj William C. Murie 
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